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QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
SYSTEM (QRAS) 
ORIGIN OF THE INVENTION 
The invention described herein was made by an employee 
of the United States Government, and may be manufactured 
and used by or for the Government for governmental pur- 
poses without the payment of any royalties thereon or 
therefor. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
1. Field of the Invention 
The present invention relates generally to risk analysis 
systems, and, in particular, to computer-based risk assess- 
ment systems. 
2. Description of the Related Art 
The prior art includes many software tools, primarily 
CAFTA, ETA, RISKMAN, and IRRAS. In addition, per- 
forming risk analysis through the construction of fault trees 
is known. 
The state-of-the-art in risk assessment software is now 
described. The current software packagesisystems for proba- 
bilistic risk assessment (PRA) utilize a fault-tree model 
approach, an event tree model approach, or event trees with 
fault trees attached to branch points. Two main examples are 
CAFTAfor WINDOWS and Riskman. Other software of the 
same genre includes IRRAS-with the WINDOWS based 
version called SAPPHIRE. 
The fundamental problem with fault trees, though, is they 
only provide an upper bound to the true risk (and this is not 
a least upper bound). Riskman and CAFTA use fault trees. 
CAFTA is essentially a large fault tree program. Riskman 
uses top level event trees and, in general, hangs fault trees 
at the branch points. 
Therefore, the Quantitative Risk Assessment System 
(QRAS) model of the present invention, as explained herein 
below, gives a better approximation to the true but unknown 
risk. 
From a structural point of view, a fault tree only looks at 
the base events and creates cut sets, and then finds the 
minimal cut sets. However, none of the prior art software 
handles all of the elements simultaneously. The prior art 
software does not allow one to change an element (a failure 
mode or a failure mode quantification) and have it changed 
everywhere it applies. If one changes the set up of a system 
in CAFTA, the prior generated cut sets still exist (in file 
form). 
On the other hand, in QRAS of the present invention, as 
explained herein below, if a user changes the structure (e.g., 
a failure mode or a failure mode quantification) of the 
system for which risk is being analyzed, then the baseline 
will be removed and all analysis runs pertaining to it will not 
exist. (More particularly, in QRAS of the present invention, 
the user must first supply a password to delete the baseline. 
Alternatively in QRAS of the present invention, the entire 
project can be saved and a new project created by a 
copyipaste function or simply by using WINDOWS 
Explorer, and then this new project can be modified.) That 
is, in QRAS of the present invention, all of the analysis runs 
will not exist unless the entire model is preserved 
unchanged. In CAFTA, on the other hand, a cut set file can 
exist, even though one can then change the original fault tree 
model and the cut set file, although inaccurate, refers both to 
the old system (because it has the refer-back name), but it 
does not really apply because the system has changed. 
2 
In addition, event sequence diagrams are known. Also 
known are failure modes, as are demand-based and time- 
based quantifications of failure modes, such as point 
estimateiuncertainty distribution, writing the probability (P) 
s as a function of variables, logistic regression for P, limit state 
functions, exponential with uncertainty in h, piecewise 
exponential, weibull-with uncertainty on 0, II, standby 
redundancy, conditional probability (exponential), and con- 
ditional probability (weibull). 
Also known is risk ranking individually by mean, by 
median, and by uncertainty (for a scenario or a failure 
mode). No software makes a distinction between scenarios 
that immediately propagate to failure (i.e., single point 
failures) and scenarios with one or more pivotal events, as 
15 in the present invention. No software internally collects the 
es of failure over scenarios and then ranks the 
individual elements or subsystems using those fundamental 
units of failure, as in the present invention. A singleton, 
which is an initiating event followed immediately by an end 
20 state, itself is known, but the present invention allows an 
immediate determination of what are those single point 
failures (i.e., singletons). 
There are, in addition, WINDOWS-based software pro- 
grams for creating and analyzing reliability block diagrams, 
25 and for incorporating uncertainties. There is also 
WINDOWS-based software for failure modes and effects 
analysis, etc. 
However, there is no conventional risk assessment soft- 
3o ware incorporating as a unit the following: ease-of-use; the 
availability of as many quantification methods; the linkage 
via a hierarchy (with plain text for names) to a time-based 
quantification and the abilities to store documentation; and 
perform sensitivity analysis (linked to original risk 
Although each individual quantification or statistical 
method used by QRAS of the present invention is known, 
the combination of these methods used as they are in QRAS 
of the present invention is unique. Moreover, there is no 
40 other software that handles event sequence diagrams (ESDs) 
and automatically translates the ESDs into event trees, as in 
the present invention. 
Further, the prior art systems are not particularly user- 
friendly. More specifically, none of the prior art systems 
45 allows the range of failure probability characterizations as in 
the present invention, none are based on a hierarchical 
arrangement with the features as in the present invention, 
none include a WINDOWS-based event-sequence diagram 
builder to automatically create event trees, as in the present 
SO invention. In addition, the prior art systems include limited 
sensitivity analysis capabilities. Also, and most importantly, 
the prior art systems do not integrate the above-mentioned 
features in a cohesive, simple, yet powerful platform. 
10 
35 analysis)-as in the present invention. 
55 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
An object of the present invention is to provide a user- 
Another object of the present invention is to provide a 
6o large range of failure probability characterizations generally, 
and, in particular, for engineering applications. 
A further object of the present invention is to provide 
user-friendly, WINDOWS-based screen features such as 
event sequence diagram generation. 
Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a 
risk analysis system with an easily-understood and gener- 
ated hierarchical decomposition of systems. 
friendly risk analysis system. 
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Yet a further object of the present invention is to provide examples of output generated by modules 46-60 of the 
a risk analysis system as a totally integrated package. QRAS 12 of the present invention; 
The present invention is a computer-based software sys- FIGS. 5B-D are flow charts showing the global design of 
tem which assesses risk at the failure mode, subsystem, and QRAS 12 of the present invention, including the architecture 
element (i.e., a group of subsystems) levels, based upon user 5 and information flow; 
supplied quantifications of failure modes, event sequences, FIG. 6 is a diagram of an elementisubsystemifailure mode 
system decomPosition, and system operating times. The hierarchy 62 produced by the build hierarchy module 46 of 
present invention is executed on a workstation in a WIN- the QRAS 12 of the present invention shown in FIG, 4; 
DOWS environment, allowing access to the features and of the steps carried out by the 
functions of the present invention from either a main menu 10 create mission timeline module 48 of FIG, 4, corresponding 
or keyboard input. 
FIG, is a flowchart 
Screen Or top level Screen options, by Of either a to the create mission timeline step SI2  of FIG, 3,  of the 
present invention; 
The ’Oftware system Of the present invention provides FIG, 8 shows the features of the phases defined in the 
features and functions such as an create mission timeline module 48 of the present invention; 
subsystemifailure mode hierarchy (herein after also referred 
FIG. 9 shows the parameters by which the OTIS are to as an elementisubsystem hierarchy or a hierarchy); cre- 
ating a mission timeline; performing failure mode quantifi- defined by the present invention; 
cation; building and quantifying event sequence diagrams FIG. 10  is a flowchart 84 of the functions provided by the 
(ESDs); including multiplicities, dependencies, and redun- Quantify Failure ModesDocumentation module 50 Of the 
dancies; creating a fixed baseline (all lowest level 2o Present invention shown in FIG. 4; 
simulations, stored); and performing sensitivity analyses, all FIG. 11 is a flowchart 88 of the functions provided by the 
based upon user input. Build and Quantify ESDs module 52 of the present inven- 
In the present invention, the above-mentioned features tion shown in FIG. 4; 
and functions are fully integrated with each other. More 25 FIG. 12 is a detailed diagram of an event sequence 
particularly, the present invention integrates features such as diagram produced by the buildiedit ESD step S304 of the 
the mission time line, an event sequence diagram generator, present invention shown in FIG. 11; 
failure probability characterizations, and sensitivity analy- FIG. 13 is a flowchart 90 of an overview of the Include 
ses. For example, the present invention includes integration module 54 of the present invention; 
failure probability characterizations, the analyses to com- subsystem~element dependencies by the present invention; 
pute risk and rank individual risks, and the sensitivity 
FIG. 14B shows an example of a fault tree 92 produced analysis. 
by the present invention; 
Further, the present invention includes an entire sensitiv- FIG. 15A is a flowchart 108 of including multiplicities in ity or “what if’  package allowing modifications of system or 35 the QRAS 12 of the present invention; failure mode probabilities, times of operation, and event 
scenarios to assess how risks could be mitigated. FIG. 15B is a flowchart 110 of including redundancies in 
the QRAS 12 of the present invention; In addition, the present invention executes multiple 
projects, and provides a ~~copyipaste~~ feature multiple FIG. 15C is a flowchart 112 of including dependencies in 
projects to allow upgraded or system replacements to be 40 the QRAs l2 Of the present invention; 
examined by a particular project. FIG. 15D is a flowchart 114 of dependencies across 
The present invention also provides links to other, elements 64 and subsystems 66 included in the QRAS 12; 
conventional, commercial off-the-shelf software products, FIG. 16 is a flowchart of the create a baseline simulation 
which links provide input from the present invention directly option (1) and the create a new analysis option (4) functions 
to the commercial off-the-shelf products and receive into the 45 Provided by the Create Fixed Baseline 56 and Generate 
present invention input directly from the commercial off- Analysis Runs 58 modules of the present invention shown in 
the-shelf products. FIG. 4; 
These together with other objects and advantages which FIG. 17 shows options 118 for selecting risk ranking 
will be subsequently apparent, reside in the details of Provided by the Create Fixed Baseline 56 and Generate 
construction and operation as more fully hereinafter Analysis Runs 58 ~ o d u l e s  of the Present invention; 
described and claimed, reference being had to the accom- FIG. 18 is a flowchart 120 of the functions provided by the 
panying drawings forming a part hereof, wherein like Perform Sensitivity Analysis module 60 of the present 
numerals refer to like parts throughout. invention shown in FIG. 4; 
Of modes with the time line, the event sequences, the 30 FIG, 14A shows the step of creating a fault tree for cross 
FIG. 19 shows a selection 122 of stand-alone programs 
55 122 accessed from the main screen of ORAS 12 of the BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FIG. 1 is a logical diagram of a software system 10 which present invention and residing in the toolbox 16 shown in 
includes the QRAS (Quantitative Risk Assessment System) FIG. 5A, 
12 of the present invention and a toolbox 16; FIG. 20Ashows edit functions copy and paste, applicable 
FIG. 2 shows an example of a conventional workstation 6o principally to the build hierarchy module 46 of the present 
30 executing QRAS 12 of the present invention; 
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the functions executed by the FIG. 20B shows options provided by the model report 
QRAS 12 of the present invention; 
FIG. 4 is a top level designiflow of the QRAS 12 of the FIG. 20C shows a lock project utility 128 provided within 
present invention; 
FIG. 5A is a graphical depiction of the top level archi- FIG. 2 1  shows an example of a main screen 130 of QRAS 
tecture of the QRAS 12 of the present invention, showing 
invention and provided therein; 
utility 126 of QRAS 12 of the present invention; 
65 QRAS 12 of the present invention; 
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FIG. 22 shows an example of a hierarchy screen 166 of 
QRAS 12; 
FIG, 23 shows an of a ~ i ~ ~ i ~ ~  phase Editor 
screen of QRAS 12; 
FIG. 24 shows an example of a Mission Timeline screen, 
specifically the defining of operational time intervals (OTIS), 
of QRAS 12; 
FIG. 25 shows an example of a Quantification Model 
Selection screen of QRAS 12; 
FIG. 26 shows an example of a Demand Basedpoint 
Estimate and Uncertainty (lognormal) Screen of QRAS 12; 
Screen of QRAS 12; 
(Quantitative Totals) of QRAS 12; 
Sensitivity Analyses of QRAS 12; and 
Options screen of QRAS 12. 
Quantify Failure ModesiDocurnentation module 50 shown 
in FIG. 4; the Build and Quantify ESDs module 52 shown 
in FIG. 4; the Generate Analysis Runs module 58 shown in 
FIG. 4; and the Perform Sensitivity Analysis module 60 
shown in FIG. 4. 
Further, QRAs 12 interfaces to ORPHEUS 22 for table 
construction 22-1 within QRAs 12, QRAs 12 also inter- 
faces to SLGGRAPH 24 for graphing failure mode 
probab es, constructing event sequence diagrams (ESDs), 
and developing analysis graphs 24-1 within QRAS 12. The 
analysis graphs f ~ c t i o n  24-1 applies to, and supports, the 
Quantify Failure ModesiDocumentation module 50 shown 
in FIG. 4; the Build and Quantify ESDs module 52 shown 
in FIG. 4. 
addition, QRAS 12 interfaces to SAPPHIRE 26 for 
encryption and locking 26-1 performed within QRAS 12. 
The encryption and locking function 26-1 is called from the 
“file” menu, and applies to and supports the Build Hierarchy 
module 46 shown in FIG. 4; the Create Mission Timeline 
2o module 48 shown in FIG. 4; the Quantify Failure Modes/ 
Documentation module 50 shown in FIG. 4; the Build and 
Quantify ESDs module 52 shown in FIG. 4; and the Create 
Fixed Baseline module 56 shown in FIG. 4. 
MATHEMATICA 18, PARADOX 20, ORPHEUS 22, 
FIG. 1 is a logical diagram of a software system 10 which 2s SLGGRAPH 24, and SAPPHIRE 26 are conventional and 
includes the QRAS (Quantitative Risk Assessment System) are known in the art, 
As will be apparent from the description that follows, 12 of the present invention and a toolbox 16. 
More Particularly, the QRAs 12 is Preferably written in QRAS 12 provides a seamless integration to the above- 
C++ (Borland), with the user interface and screen develop- mentioned commercial, off-the-shelf software packages 
ment performed in DELPHI (Borland). Toolbox 16, which is 30 included in the toolbox 16, QRAS 12 initiates execution of 
a set of internal codes/Programs called by QRAs 12 rather any and all of the commercial, off-the-shelf software pack- 
than actual “tools”, includes conventional programs such as ages included in the toolbox 16 and incorporates the output 
MATHEMATICA (Wolfram Research) for equation of the commercial, off-the-shelf software packages included 
resolution, PARADOX (Borland) for database management, in toolbox 16 into the QRAS 12, 
ORPHEUS (TurboPower Software) for table construction, 3s The QRAS 12 of present invention can be executed by 
generation, and although QRAS 12 is designed to run on a 200 mhz personal 
encryption and locking. computer in a WINDOWS 95 environment. Ideally, a 15 or 
Both the QRAs 12 and the conventional commercial, 4o 17 inch monitor should be used, and the screen resolution 
off-the-shelf software packages included in the toolbox 16 must be set to 1024x768. 
are Preferably running under the WINDOWS 95 operating An example of a conventional workstation 30 executing 
system. QRAS 12 of the present invention is shown in FIG. 2. As 
The particular functions within QRAS 12 to which the shown in FIG. 2, workstation 30 includes a processor 32 
conventional commercial, off-the-shelf software packages 4s executing the software system 10 (which includes QRAS 12 
included in toolbox 16 interface are mentioned with refer- of the present invention); a memory 34 storing the software 
ence to FIG. 1, and are explained herein below during the system 10; user interfaces such as a display 36, a printer 38, 
detailed description of QRAS 12 beginning with reference to and an input device 40; and I/O device 41, all coupled to 
FIG. 4. each other by bus 33. In the present invention, the input 
EMATICA 18 to construct a Failure Mode (FM) Quantita- Also shown in FIG. 2 is a communication line 42 inter- 
tive Mode 18-1, perform analyses 18-2, and to baseline 18-3 facing to another workstation 44, preferably using File 
the analyses 18-2 within QRAS 12. The failure mode Transfer Protocol (FTP). In the present invention, multiple 
quantitative mode function 18-1 resides in the Quantify users may contribute to and supply the above-mentioned 
Failure Modes/Documentation module 50 and in the Build 5s quantifications of failure modes, event trees, system 
and Quantify ESDs module 52 shown in FIG. 4; the perform decomposition, and system operating times developed on 
analyses function 18-2 is a file of stored analyses (i.e., the another workstation 44 to the QRAS 12 residing on the 
quantitative results, the scenarios, and their ranking) and workstation 30 through communication line 42, or by pro- 
resides in the Generate Analysis Runs module 58 shown in viding same on, for example, a diskette. 
FIG. 4; and the baseline function 18-3 is a datafile contain- 60 The QRAS 12 performs three high-level functions, 
ing scenarios, run at the lowest level and stored, and resides including building a risk model, running an analysis, and 
in the Create Fixed Baseline module 56 shown in FIG. 4. running sensitivity analyses. FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the 
Likewise, QRAs 12 interfaces to PARADOX 20 for functions executed by the QRAS 12: a risk model is built in 
database management 20-1 and table storage 20-2. The step so8; an analysis is run in step s20; and sensitivity 
database management function 20-1 is the database support- 6s analyses are run in step s22. 
ing the build hierarchy module 46 shown in FIG. 4; the Referring now to FIG. 3, the QRAS 12 in step SO8 builds 
Create Mission Timeline module 48 shown in FIG. 4; the the risk model. More particularly, in step S10, an element/ 
27 shows an Of an Event Sequence Diagram in FIG, 4; and the Generate Analysis Runs module 58 shown 
FIG. 28 shows an example of an Analysis Results screen 1s 
FIG. 29 shows an example of the options for dealing with 
FIG, 30 shows an of a sensitivity h a l y s i s  
DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED 
EMBODIMENTS 
SLGGRAPH (SLG Data Systems and for graph any WINDOWS 95-based workstation or equivalent, 
p. for 
As shown in FIG. 1, QRAS 12 interfaces to MATH- 50 device includes a keyboard and/or a mouse. 
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subsystemifailure mode hierarchy is constructed. Then, in 
step S12, a mission timeline is created. Next, in step S14, 
failure modes are quantified. In step S16, event sequence 
diagrams are then built or edited. Multiplicities, 
dependencies, and redundancies are included in step s18. 
analysis is generated. Sensitivity analysis is performed in 
step S22. 
The above-mentioned steps are explained in further detail 
with reference to corresponding modules shown in FIG. 4 
and executing the steps. 
FIG. 4 is a top level designiflow of the QRAS 12 of the 
subsystems, two of which are shown in FIG. 5A as SSME 
(Space Shuttle main engine) 64-1 and ET (external tank) 
64-2. 
The hierarchy 62 includes the root 63 (the top level of the 
5 system to be analyzed), elements 64 (co~~ections of 
QRAs 12, the system 63 is broken down into its component 
parts, and at the lowest level, failure modes 68 are associated 
with these parts, 
Using the Space Shuttle as an example, the root 63 would 
be the Space Shuttle itself, and the elements 64 are the Space 
In step s20, a system is created, and a subsystems), subsystems 66, and failure modes 68. In the 
present invention, As shown in FIG, 4, the QRAs 12 builds 
the risk model using the build risk model module 45, The 
Main Engines 64-1, the Tank (ET) 
64-2, the Rocket Boosters (sRBs) (not shown in 
build risk model module corresponds to the build risk model 5A)3 the 
step SO8 shown in FIG. 3. More particularly, the QRAS 12 5A)3 and the Orbiter (not shown in 
builds a hierarchy with the build hierarchy module 46, then The subsystems 66 below the SSME include, for example, 
creates a mission timeline with the create mission timeline the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) 66-1 and 
module 48, quantifies failure modes with the quantify failure 66-2, Main Combustion Chamber (MCC), 66-3, etc. Failure 
modesidocumentation module 50, buildsiedits event modes for the HPOTP 66-1 include turbine blade fracture 
sequence diagrams with the build and quantify ESDs mod- 2o 68-1, bearing failure 68-2, beating failure 68-3, porosity 
ule 52, and includes multiplicities, dependencies, and redun- 68-4, etc. As part of the SSME (element 64-l), the number 
dancies with the Include: Multiplicities, Dependencies, “(3)” is indicated as the multiplicity number. Likewise, as 
Redundancies module 54. The foregoing modules 46-54 part of the porosity (failure mode 68-4), the number “(122)” 
shown in FIG. 4 correspond, respectively, to steps S10418 is indicated as the multiplicity number. The multiplicity 
shown in FIG. 3. 
Analysis runs are generated by QRAS 12 by the create Once constructed, the hierarchy 62 appears on the left side 
fixed baselines 56igenerate analysis runs 58 module of the of most screens of the QRAS 12, and serves as a navigator. 
QRAs 12, corresponding to the create baseline and generate For example, once a specific failure mode 68 is selected by 
analysis step S20 of FIG. 3. 3o the user (by pointing the mouse to a specific failure mode 68 
Sensitivity analysis is performed by the perform sensitiv- and clicking on that failure mode), and then subsequent 
ity analysis module 60, corresponding to the perform sen- operations pertain only to that failure mode 68. In the 
sitivity analysis step S22 shown in FIG. 3. Sensitivity example shown in FIG. 5A, the failure mode of a manifold 
analysis is performed by altering sensitivities (which are weld failure 68-10 is shown. 
discussed in further detail herein below). The risk analyses 35 As shown in FIG. SA, after creating the hierarchy 62, the 
are re-run with the altered sensitivities. Although not shown create mission timeline module 46 creates a mission timeline 
in FIG. 4, but explained in further detail herein below, each 70 based upon user input. The time line 70 establishes the 
of functions 46-60 of the QRAS 12 is initiated and modified mission phases and the time intervals for each subsystem’s 
by a user either from a main menu from which one or more operation (these time intervals are referred to as operational 
of the functions 46-60 is selected, or through selection of 4o time intervals, or OTIS). The phases are the main time 
one or more of functions 46-60 from a tool bar displayed on segments for which the user wishes to estimate risk. For 
each screen of the QRAs 12. The operation and flow of example, the phases for the Space Shuttle are “Ascent,” 
modules 46-60 is explained in further detail herein below. “On-orbit,” and “Reentry.” Since the OTIS indicate times of 
Beginning with FIG. 5A, the present invention is operation, any time-distributed failure densities use these 
explained using examples of risk analysis based upon the 45 times to compute probabilities. 
Space Shuttle. It will be appreciated by those skilled in the After creating the hierarchy 62 and the mission time line 
art that the present invention is applicable to any engineered 70, the quantify failure modesidocumentation module 50 
hardware complex system, including engineering systems, quantifies the failure modes 72 based upon user input. As 
the failure analysis of which can be characterized by shown in FIG. SA, failure mode quantification 72 may be in 
elementisubsystemifailure mode hierarchy. so the form of a probability distribution (as shown), engineer- 
FIG. 5A is a graphical depiction of the top level archi- ing models, or as functions well-known to those of ordinary 
tecture of the QRAS 12 of the present invention, showing skill in the art. 
examples of output generated by modules 46-60 of the Next, the QRAS 12 creates an event sequence diagram 74 
QRAs 12. The multiplicities, dependencies, and redundan- for each failure mode 68 through the build and quantify 
cies module 54 shown separately in FIG. 4 also includes a 55 ESDs module 52. In the event sequence diagram 74 shown 
Rocket Motors (sRMs) (not shown in 
5A). 
25 number is explained in detail with reference to FIG. 13. 
fault tree and is integrated into the functions shown in FIG. in FIG. SA, a series of queries (74-1 through 74-7 in the 
5A, as explained in further detail with reference to FIGS. 13, example shown in FIG. 5A) are performed to determine 
14A, 14B, and 15A-D. whether the manifold weld failure 68-10 leads to a cata- 
As shown in FIG. 5A, the build hierarchy module 46 of strophic result (CAT) or to a loss of vehicle (LOV). To 
FIG. 4 develops an elementisubsystemifailure mode hierar- 60 quantify the ESD by the build and quantify ESDs module 
chy 62 based upon user input. The elementisubsystemi 52, an event tree 76 is then constructed corresponding to 
failure mode hierarchy 62 includes a root 63, which corre- each event sequence diagram 74, indicating whether each 
sponds to and uniquely identifies a system being analyzed by pathway shown in the event tree leads to success (S) or 
the QRAS 12. In the example shown in FIG. 5A, the root 63 failure (F) of the system being analyzed. 
corresponds to the Space Shuttle. Next, the hierarchy 62, the mission timeline 70, the failure 
The hierarchy 62, which is a hierarchical decomposition mode quantification 72, the event sequence diagram 74, and 
of the system, is then broken down into more specific the event tree 76 are baselined by the create fixed baseline 
65 
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module 56. An analysis is run by the generate analysis runs Step S36 of FIG. 5C corresponds to the Create Fixed 
module 58, over the selected phases and level of the hier- Baseline and Generate Analysis step S20 shown previously 
archy 62 (for example, the level may be the Space Shuttle in FIG. 3 and to the Create Fixed Baseline module 56 and 
Main Engines (SSMEs) so that results are obtained at the to the Generate Analysis Runs module 58 shown previously 
SSME level and all levels below it). s in FIGS. 4 and 5A, and is explained in detail with reference 
Analysis results 59 obtained by the generate analysis runs to FIGS. 16 and 17. Step s37 of FIG. 5c corresponds to the 
module 58 are shown in FIG. 5A. As shown in FIG. 5A, the Perform Sensitivity Analysis step s22 shown previously in 
user may select risk (scenario and failure modes) by root, FIG. 3 and to the Perform Sensitivity Analysis m d u l e  60 
element, or subsystem, and may view the risk ranked over shown Previously in FIGS. 4 and 5A, and is explained in 
the entire system, within an element, or within a subsystem, 10 detail with reference to FIG. 18. Step s38 of FIG. 5D 
using the QRAS 12. corresponds to the tool box 16 shown previously in FIG. 5A, 
and is explained in detail with reference to FIGS. 19 and 
to modify failure mode values, eliminate failure modes, 2oA-c. 
replace subsystems with other models, etc., and view risk Next, each of QRAs 12 ~ o d u l e s  4-60 are explained in 
analysis based thereon, in what is referred to as sensitivity detail. 
runs, which are executed by the Sensitivity Analysis module FIG. 6 is a diagram of an elementisubsystemifailure mode 
60. More particularly, the sensitivity analysis module 60 hierarchy 62 produced by the build hierarchy module 46 of 
removes the old (baselined) subsystem and replace it with a the QRAS 12 shown in FIG. 4. The build hierarch module 
new design, changes failure possibilities for initiating 46 corresponds to the build hierarchy step S10 shown in 
events, eliminates failure modes, varies parameters of engi- 2o FIG. 3. 
neering models, deletes a failure mode or a subsystem, As shown in FIG. 6, the elementisubsystemifailure mode 
changes multiplicity and/or redundancy, and changes event hierarchy 62 includes a root 63 (corresponding to a system). 
sequence diagrams, all based upon user input. The root 63 includes k elements, 64-1 through 64-k. Each 
The toolbox 16 available to the user through the QRAS 12 element 64 includes subsystems 66, and each subsystem 66 
includes conventional commercial programs such as 25 includes failure modes 68. 
MATHEMATICA, BAYESIAN, EXPERT OPINION, or The build hierarchy module 46 builds the elementi 
other, user-specified, capabilities for inclusion into the subsystemifailure mode hierarchy 62 based upon user input. 
above-mentioned features. The build hierarchy module 46 decomposes a system and 
Therefore, as shown in FIG. 5A, for a given system, and 3o constructs the elementisubsystemifailure mode hierarchy 
based upon user input, QRAS 12: creates a hierarchy and 62, based upon user input. Using the build hierarchy module 
mission time line; then quantifies the failure modes (with 46 and based upon user input, the QRAs 12 establishes a 
point estimate probabilities and uncertainties); draws event system (or root) 63, then adds an element 64-1 to the root 63, 
sequence diagrams showing the potential progression of adds a subsystem 66-1 to the element 64-1, and adds failure 
events given failure; and with this model, runs risk analyses 35 modes 68-11 through 68-lk to element 64-1. Likewise, 
using the Analysis and Sensitivity modules. QRAS 12 renames or deletes any or all of the system 63, the 
FIGS. 5B-D show a flow chart showing the global design elements 64, the subsystems 66, and the failure modes 68, 
of QRAS 12 of the present invention, including the archi- using the build hierarchy module 46 and user input thereto. 
tecture and information flow shown in Steps 1-6 (FIGS. 5B Also based upon user input, the build hierarchy module 46 
and 5C) and other features (FIG. 5D). Steps 1-6 of the flow 4o moves UP Or down all Or Part of the elementisubsystem/ 
of QRAS 12 (numbered as steps S31-S37, respectively) and failure mode hierarchy 62, stores, accesses and displays 
the other features of QRAS 12 (numbered as step S38) are documentation and images of the elements 64 and sub- 
detail with reference to FIGS. 6-20. constructed by the build hierarchy module 46 from the 
Build Hierarchy step s i 0  shown previous~y in FIG, 3 and to In addition, the elementisubsystemifailure mode hierar- 
the Build Hierarchy module 46 shown previously in FIGS. chy 62 appears on every other Screen displayed by the 
4 and 5A, and is explained in detail with reference to FIG. QRAS 12 as a navigator, and links to features and functions 
6. Step S32 of FIG. 5B corresponds to the Create Mission Provided in other ~ o d u l e s  of the QRAs 12 by allowing the 
Timeline step S12 shown previously in FIG. 3 and to the 50 user to highlight (by Pointing and clicking using a mouse) as 
Create Mission Timeline module 48 shown previously in a symbol the system 63, any of the elements 64, any of the 
FIGS. 4 and 5A, and is explained in detail with reference to subsystems 66, Or any of the failure modes 68. The element/ 
FIGS. 7-9. Step S33 of FIG. 5B corresponds to the Quantify SubSYstemifailure mode hierarchy 62 uses the highlighted 
Failure Modes step S14 shown previously in FIG. 3 and to symbol as a reference link to the other functions. 
the Quantify Failure Modes/Documentation module 50 5s The build hierarchy module 46, through user input, copies 
shown previously in FIGS. 4 and 5A, and is explained in (or pastes) all or part of the hierarchy 62 to another project 
detail with reference to FIG. 10. Step S34 of FIG. 5B (not shown in FIG. 6) or within the same project 63. In this 
corresponds to the BuildiEdit ESD step S16 shown previ- regard, the build hierarchy module 46 provides the functions 
ously in FIG. 3 and to the Build and Quantify ESDs module of “Paste”, which copies only the structure of the hierarchy 
52 shown previously in FIGS. 4 and 5A, and is explained in 60 62, and “Paste special”, which copies the structure of the 
detail with reference to FIGS. 11 and 12. hierarchy 62 and all quantifications 72 and event sequence 
Step S35 of FIG. 5C corresponds to the Include diagrams74. 
Multiplicities, Dependencies, and Redundancies step S18 FIG. 7 is a flowchart 80 of the steps carried out by the 
shown previously in FIG. 3 and to the Include: create mission timeline module 48 of FIG. 4, corresponding 
Multiplicities, Dependencies, and Redundancies module 54 65 to the create mission timeline step SI2 of FIG. 3. 
shown previously in FIGS. 4 and 5A, and is explained in As shown in FIG. 7, the create mission timeline module 
detail with reference to FIGS. 13,14A, 14B, and 15A-15D. 48, in step S100, defines mission phases based upon user 
QRAS 12 also provides the function of allowing the 
shown graphically in FIGS, 5B-D and are explained in systems 66 provided therewith, and displays a fault tree 
More particularly, step S31 of FIG. 5B corresponds to the 45 elementisubsystemifailure mode hierarchy 62. 
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input. Mission phase definition is discussed in further detail, 
with reference to FIG. 8. 
Next, in step ~ 1 0 2 ,  the create mission timeline module 48 
ing by the user the subsystem 66 on a screen displayed by 5 
the create mission timeline module 48, typically by pointing A is then made in step s210, between the 
to the subsystem 66 with a and clicking on the demand based failure mode and the time based failure mode. 
Documentation for the failure mode is then entered, in subsystem 66. 
step S212. Documentation includes explanations and 
up operational time intervals (OTIS) for each subsystem, lo mode, The documentation is stored in QRAs 12, and 
based upon user input. OTIs are discussed in further detail includes images as well as text, 
with reference to FIG. 9. Then, in step S106, failure modes FIG, 11 is a flowchart 88 of the functions provided by the 
are tagged to individual OTIs by the create mission timeline Build and Quantify E S D ~  module 52 shown in FIG, 4, The 
module 48. 1s Build and Quantify ESDs module 52 corresponds to, and 
After completion of step S106, each project (or system implements the functions provided in, the BuildiEdit ESD 
62) has distinct phases of operation, and, for each failure step S16 shown in FIG. 3. 
mode, the OTIs are designated within each phase. As shown in FIG. 11, a failure mode is highlighted in step 
The create mission timeline module 48 adds or deletes S300. The highlighted failure mode 86 is input from the 
one or more phases, adds or deletes one or more OTIs, and 2o hierarchy 62, and includes a combination of the failure mode 
tags a failure mode to an OTI, based upon user input. 68, the phase, and the OTI. Likewise, the applicable, cor- 
FIG. 8 shows the features of the phases defined in the responding OTI is highlighted in step s302. 
create mission timeline module 48. The operation of the Then, in step S304, the event sequence diagram (ESD) is 
system 63 for which risk is being assessed by the QRAS 12 builtiedited. The event sequence diagram is explained in 
is viewed as comprising contiguous phases. As shown in 2s further detail with reference to FIG. 12. Features which are 
FIG. 8, start and stop times 82-1 through 82-k corresponding included by the buildiedit ESD step S304 into the Build and 
to each of phases 1 through k (80-1 through 80-k) for the Quantify ESDs module 52 include point and click for 
system are defined by the user and input into QRAS 12. The symbols; insert element; copyipaste ESD segment; delete 
phases may overlap with each other. ESD segment; and select end state. The foregoing features 
FIG. 9 shows the parameters by which the OTIS are 30 are available for a given type of ESD symbol, such as the 
defined, F~~ each subsystem 66, 0l -1~ are defined within end state, and are presented when the user “right clicks” on 
each phase. The OTIs are used for time dependent failure the symbol. 
mode quantifications, explained herein below. 
In the create mission timeline module 48. each failure 
provided. Time input is from the mission time line OTI. The 
fl is the fraction of all failures of a unit (e.g., subsystem or 
element) which occur concurrently with other identical units 
selects a subsystem 66 from the hierarchy 62, by highlight- due to a common cause. The QRAs l2 that units 
simultaneously~ and that O‘fl‘. 
In step SI042 the create mission timeline module 48 sets assumptions provided by an engineer quantifying the failure 
ESD end states are defined in table 1: 
mode is tagged to (or associated with) a phase or phases and 3s 
the OTIs where valid. 
The mission phase times and OTI times may run from -x 
TABLE 1 
ESD End State Definition 
to +y. That is, the mission phase times and O n  times can be 
example, the ascent phase runs from -5 minutes to +13 40 
minutes. MS 
CAT 
SEVH 
SEVM 
SEVL 
negative numbers, if desired. In the Space Shuttle, for 
catastrophic 
severity high 
severity medium 
severity low 
mission success 
PF permanent failure FIG. 10 is a flowchart 84 of the functions provided by the 
Quantify Failure Modes/Documentation module 50 shown 
in FIG. 4. The Quantify Failure ModesiDocumentation 4s The permanent failure end state is used with the redun- 
module 50 corresponds to, and implements the functions dancy feature of the QRAs 12. 
Provided in, the quantify failure modes step SI4 shown in Next, in step S308, the ESD pivotal events are quantified. 
FIG. 3. Documentation is added in step S310. As described herein 
As shown in FIG. 10, a failure mode is highlighted in step above, documentation includes explanations and assump- 
S200. The highlighted failure mode 86 is input from the so tions provided by an engineer quantifying the failure mode. 
hierarchy 62, and includes a combination of the failure mode The documentation is stored in QRAS 12, and includes 
68, the phase, and the OTI. Likewise, the applicable, cor- images as well as text. 
responding OTI is highlighted in step S202. FIG. 12 is a detailed diagram of an event sequence 
Failure modes are then quantified in step S204. Failure diagram produced by the buildiedit ESD step S304 shown in 
modes are either demand based or time based. Demand 5s FIG. 11. The highlighted failure mode 86 (from the hierar- 
based failure modes are shown in step S206, and include chy 62 and which is tagged to the phaseiOT1) serves as the 
point estimateiuncertainty distribution, writing the probabil- initiating event in the event sequence diagram 74. The event 
ity (P) as a function of variables, a logistic regression for P, sequence diagram 74 includes pivotal events (PE) 74-11 
a discrete step function for P, or a limit state function. (PEl), 74-12 (PE2), . . . , 74-111 (PEn), and each pivotal 
On the other hand, time based failure modes are shown in 60 event reaches an end state (ES) 74-21 (ESl), 74-22 (ES2), 
step S208. As shown in step S208, time based failure modes 74-23 (ES3), . . . , 74-2m(ESm). All pivotal events are 
include exponential, with uncertainty in h; piecewise expo- quantified with the same options as the failure modes, 
nential; wiebull, with uncertainty on fl, q; standby redun- discussed with reference to FIG. 10. Time dependencies are 
dancy; conditional probability: exponential; and conditional taken from the mission timeline 70. Definitions pertinent to 
probability: weibull. Further, engineering based limit state 6s features included in the Event Sequence Diagrams 74 are: 
function and expressing the probability of failure directly as Comment Boxes (CB). CBs can appear anywhere in the 
a function of physical variables (and their uncertainties) are ESD. They are used for filling in descriptive information 
US 6,223,143 B1 
13 14 
regarding the development of an ESD scenario. They have 
no probabilistic interpretation and are not quantifiable. They 
do not appear in the event tree which is automatically 
generated from the ESD. 
Pivotal Event (PE). An event in an ESD scenario after the 
initiating event and before the end state(s). Pivotal events 
(PES) determine whether and how an IE propagates to a 
specified end state. PES may be protective, mitigative, 
5 aggravative, or benign events which help determine whether 
and how an IE Propagates to a specified end state. Multiple 
PES may be used to reach an end state. It is also permissible 
to have no PES in those cases where an IE Propagates 
directly to a single end state. A PE name should be Phrased 
as a question that can be answered ‘‘Yes” Or “No” and should 
be entered into the upper Part of the PE box. Designators of 
PES are defined automatically by QRAS and entered into the 
lower part of the PE box. The two outlinks are annotated 
“Yes” or “No.” Each outlink is represented by a line ema- 
from the right side of a PE. “No” lines are vertical and come 
from the bottom of a PE. The PE “Yes” outlink is assigned 
a time distributed or demand based probability of occurrence 
and an uncertainty in accordance with the specifications for 
characterizing a failure probability. The probability of the 
20 “No” outlink is automatically be computed by the QRAS 
system, 
Time Distributed Events. In contrast to “demand based 
events” (see earlier definition), these are events with speci- 
fied time-to-occurrence distributions within a given tirne 
belongs to this class of events; e.g., APU fails to run after it 
has run for a time, t, given that it has started to run. 
Time Condition (TC). A time condition determines the 
path that is followed through an ESD scenario beyond the 
straint. TCs are based on deterministic time limits and the 
allowable choices are: 
Demand Based Events. These are: 
(a) Events which occur at the specific time (absolute 
mission tirne or tirne relative to the Occurrence of a previous 
event) an item is called upon (demanded) to function. The 
outcome of such an event is binary, either success or failure, 
yes or no, etc. The failure of components to start belong to 
this class of events; e.g., APU fails to start, SRM fails to 
ignite. 
(b) Events which occur Over an interval of time, for which 
the probability of failure Over the length of the interval is 
effect the time interval is considered to be a single 
demand and the item’s performance is classified as either 
or failure; e,g,, the failure probability of an SSME 
Over the Space Shuttle,s ascent phase of 520 seconds may be 
expressed as a point value with an uncertainty distribution-in 
this sense, the success or failure of the SSME in that interval 
is a demand based event. 
End State (ES). An ES is the last event in an ESD 
scenario, and is a termination point of an ESD scenario. 
can have many scenarios. 
Allowable ESs are: 
(a) Catastrophic (CAT) 
(b) Mission Success (MS) 
expressed as a point estimate and an uncertainty distribution. nating from the PE. ‘‘Yes” lines are horizontal and come 
Each scenario in an ESD terminates in a single ES. An ESD 25 interval, The failure of components while in operation 
(c) Mission Success (MSR) (but with failure of a redun- 3o TC point, depending On an Or time con- 
dant subsystem) 
(d) Loss of Mission (LOM) (but, not catastrophic) 
Permanent Failure (PF) (of a subsystem) (this end state is 
to allow the off-line use of QRAS ESDs for calculating 
intermediate results-usuallv of redundant subsvstems- 35 a . t 2 a  d . t < b  e . a S t < b  
I 
that is subsequently used in other on-line QRAS ESDs that b . t > a  e. a S t S b h . a < t S b  
c . t S b  f. a < t < b lead to one or more of the end states in (a) through (d), 
above). 
Severity High, Medium, or Low (SEVH, SEVM, SEVL, where t i s  the time variable over the time interval of the ESD 
respectively): These allow the user to define other degrada- 40 and a and b are values of absolute or relative time; e.g., 
tion categories that may be useful to track. mission elapsed time or time relative to (after) another 
Event Sequence Diagram (ESD). An ESD depicts one or specified event (the time units are assumed to be the same as 
more accident or failure scenarios, all of which begin with the default units of the “phase” in which the ESD applies). 
a single initiating event, may include one or more pivotal For the Space Shuttle, default time units for its phases are: 
events and/or time conditions, and terminate in one or more 45 pre-ascent in seconds, ascent in seconds measured from T-0 
specified end states. (with SSME start at T-6), on-orbit in days measured from 
Initiating Event (IE). This is the first event in an ESD. An end of ascent, and entry in minutes measured to wheel stop. 
IE is an abnormality, malfunction, or failure (human, The two outlinks are annotated “Yes” or “No.” Each outlink 
hardware, software, process, or other) that causes a deviation is represented by a line emanating from the time switch. 
from desired operation. IEs are synonymous with failure SO “Yes” lines are horizontal and come from the right side of a 
modes in the QRAS system hierarchy in a specific opera- time switch. “No” lines are vertical and come from the 
tional time interval. Each ESD begins with a single IE. An bottom. TCs that are satisfied are effectively transparent to 
IE can be a time distributed event during a particular time the scenarios in which they reside. TCs that are not satisfied 
interval (the time-to-event distribution, or a point estimate divert their scenarios onto alternate paths. TCs appear in the 
and uncertainty for the event probability over the time ss event tree automatically generated from the ESD by the 
interval, and the start and end times (absolute time) for the QRAS system. TCs work in conjunction with IEs or PES. A 
interval must be specified) or it can be a demand based event TC may be placed in a scenario after a time dependent PE 
occurring at a specific point in time (the point estimate and and attached to either of its outlinks, whichever is appro- 
uncertainty of the event probability). priate. A TC may also be used in an ESD which begins with 
subordinate to a phase and unique to a specific subsystem. FIGS. 13, 14A, 14B, and 15A-D are flowcharts of the 
The runtime of a subsystem in a particular phase may be functions provided by the Include: Multiplicities, 
divided into multiple OTIS. Dependencies, Redundancies module 54 shown in FIG. 4. 
Phase. One of a number of time intervals unique to the The Include: Multiplicities, Dependencies, Redundancies 
top-level system under analysis; e.g., for the Space Shuttle: 65 module 54 corresponds to, and implements the functions 
pre-ascent, ascent, on-orbit, and re entryilanding are four provided in, the Include: Multiplicities, Dependencies, 
phases. Redundancies step S18 shown in FIG. 3. 
Operational Time Interval (OTI). A time interval which is 60 a time dependent IE. 
US 6,223,143 B1 
15 16 
FIG. 13 is a flowchart 90 of an overview of the Include 54 highlights an element 64 or subsystem 66 based upon 
module 54. As shown in step S400 of FIG. 13, the user user input. Then in step S802, the Include module 54 allows 
highlights an element 64, a subsystem 66, or a failure mode the user to input a k-out-of-N number for success, and stores 
68 in the hierarchy 62, using the Include module 54. Next, the number input by the user. The hierarchy 62 is modified 
in step S402, the user selects using the Include module 54, 5 by the Include module 54 by the symbol (K-of-N), in step 
the inclusion of either multiplicities, redundancies, or depen- S804. 
dencies. Multiplicities place within the hierarchy 62 a mul- Dependencies are included in the QRAS 12 as shown in 
tiplicity number k next to the selected element, subsystem, flowchart 112 in FIG. 15C. In step S900, the Include module 
or failure mode. The multiplicity number k indicates that the 54 highlights an element 64 or subsystem 66 based upon 
selected element, subsystem, or failure mode is accounted user input. Then in step S902, the Include module 54 
for k times in analyzing the risk of system 63 by the QRAS completes, based also on user input, common cause fl values 
12. For example, and referring now to FIG. 5A, the hierar- for catastrophic failure (CAT) and permanent failure (PF). 
chy 62 indicates therein with a multiplicity number (3) that Dependencies across elements 64 and subsystems 66 are 
there are 3 SSMEs within the Space Shuttle 63. Therefore, included in the QRAS 12 as shown in flowchart 114 in FIG. 
instead of having to build 3 identical elements, one for each 15D. In step S1000, the hierarchy feature (i.e., an element 64 
SSME, the user indicates with the multiplicity number (3) or subsystem 66) about which the fault tree 92 is to be 
that 3 SSMEs must be accounted for by the QRAS 12 in established is selected by the Include module 54 based upon 
analyzing the risk for the Space Shuttle 63. Likewise, and user input. Then in step S1002, the Include module 54 builds 
also shown in FIG. 5A, multiplicity number (122) indicates the fault tree 92 by allowing the user to highlight elements 
that there are 122 failure modes for the porosity in the 64 and/or subsystems 66 and to "click" with the mouse on 
subsystem 66-1. 
Also as shown in step S402, the user may select redun- Once steps S10-S18 shown in FIG. 3 have been com- 
dancies using the Include module 54. Redundancies enter pleted by, respectively, modules 46-54 shown in FIG. 4, a 
into the hierarchy a factor of k-of-N, meaning that the risk model for system 63 has been constructed by QRAS 12. 
system 63 needs k of N elements 64, subsystems 66, or Once the risk model is constructed, the QRAS 12 includes 
failure modes 68 to work to avoid catastrophic failure. 25 a lock feature (with Password) to Prevent unauthorized users 
addition, and also as shown in step ~ 4 0 2 ,  the may from changing data provided in the risk model. In addition, 
10 
20 Fault Tree Symbols (i.e., AND-OR logic symbols). 
select dependencies using the Include module 54, The 
selection of Dependencies causes the Include module 54 to 
Copypaste features exist for the hierarchy 62. Further, 
quantification features provided in the quantify 
modes/documentation module 50 are linked to Mathematica. display a screen allowing the user to enter the fl for the The Create Fixed Baseline 56 and Generate Analysis 
tions provided in, the Create Baseline and Generate Analysis factor for common cause failures. 
Also from the Dependencies selection, or from the hier- step ~ 2 0  shown in FIG, 3, 
archy 62, the Include module 54 creates a fault tree for cross The create Fixed ~ ~ ~ ~ l i ~ ~  56 and G~~~~ ~~ h a l y s i s  
subsystem 66 or element 64 dependencies, as shown in step R~~~ 58 modules shown in FIG, 4 provide 4 main options: 
s500 in FIG. 144. An example of a fault tree 92 is shown 35 (1) create a baseline simulation; (2) delete baseline; (3) view 
in FIG. 14B. a prior stored analysis; and (4) create a new analysis. The 
As shown in FIG. 14B, fault tree 92 accounts for situa- delete baseline option (2), when selected by the user, simply 
tions in which and/or logic regarding multiple elements or removes the current baseline from QRAS 12. The view a 
subsystems is included in assessing by QRAS 12 the risk prior stored analysis option (3), when selected by the user, 
associated with system 63. In the fault tree 92 example 40 simply retrieves from memory a prior stored analysis, and 
shown in FIG. 14B, failure modes 94, 96, 100, and 102 displays the analysis to the user. The create a baseline 
contribute to the risk for system 63 based upon logic simulation option (1) and the create a new analysis option 
associated with OR gates 98 and 104, an AND gate 106. (4) are explained in further detail, with reference to FIG. 16. 
FIGS. 15A-D are flowcharts of the functions provided by FIG. 16 is a flowchart of the create a baseline simulation 
the Include: Multiplicities, Dependencies, Redundancies 45 option (1) and the create a new analysis option (4) functions 
module 54 shown in FIG. 4. The Include: Multiplicities, provided by the Create Fixed Baseline 56 and Generate 
Dependencies, Redundancies module 54 corresponds to, and Analysis Runs 58 modules shown in FIG. 4. 
implements the functions provided in, the Include: Selection of the create a baseline simulation (option (1)) 
Multiplicities, Dependencies, Redundancies step S18 shown results in the flowchart 116 shown in FIG. 16 being 
in FIG. 3. SO executed, beginning with step SllOO and continuing through 
Multiplicities are included in the QRAS 12 as shown in step S1112. In step SllOO shown in FIG. 16, simulation 
flowchart 108 in FIG. 15A. In step S600, the Include module parameters are first set, based on user input. Then, in step 
54 highlights an element 64, subsystem 66 or failure mode S1102, the baseline simulation is created. Creating a base- 
68 based upon user input. Then in step S602, a multiplicity line simulation includes resolving all event sequence dia- 
number k is chosen by the user and input into the Include ss grams 74 and executing simulations created and stored at the 
module 54. Then, the hierarchy 62 is modified by the symbol level of the phase/OTl/Scenario. 
k. For example, by using the Include module 54, if the user The baseline is created based upon simulations run at the 
highlights a subsystem 66-1 (step S600) and inputs k=3 as lowest level possible, i.e., the failure mode level 68. The 
the multiplicity number (step S602), then the hierarchy 62 is simulations are saved and stored as the baseline. The base- 
modified by Include module 54 to repeat subsystem 66-1 3 60 line is then password-protected, so that the same analysis 
times within the hierarchy 62 or (preferably) to maintain results for each execution of QRAS for each system 63. 
only one representation within the hierarchy 62 of sub- Only a user having the password is able to change the 
system 66-1 but indicate within the hierarchy 62 that sub- baseline. 
system 66-1 should be processed as repeated 3 times (step Selection of the create a new analysis (option (4)) also 
S604). 65 results in the flowchart 116 shown in FIG. 16 being 
Redundancies are included in the QRAS 12 as shown in executed. Execution of flowchart 116 begins with step 
flowchart 110 in FIG. 15B. In step S800, the Include module S1104. 
subsystem, Or mode. The fl is the 30 Runs 58 modules correspond to, and implement the func- 
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In step S1104, the level (system 63, element 64, sub- 
system 66, or failure mode 68) of the hierarchy 62 is then 
selected by being highlighted based upon user input. 
An analysis run is created in step S1106 for the selected 
level and the levels below the selected level. For example, 5 
if an element 64 is highlighted, then an analysis run is 
created for the element 64, the subsystems 66 belonging to 
that element 64, and the failure modes 68 belonging to each 
subsystem 66 belonging to the element 64. 
Risks are then ranked by subsystems, failure modes, and 
scenarios, in step S1108. Options for ranking of risks 
provided by QRAS 12 include mean, median, or uncertainty. 
A more detailed discussion of ranking of risks by QRAS 12 
is provided with reference to FIG. 17. 
Point estimates and uncertainty distributions are run at the 
selected (highlighted) level, in step s1110. QRAs 12 Pro- 
vides point estimates or complete uncertainty. 
In step S1112, an event tree 76 is created by QRAs 12 if 
a failure mode 68 is selected by being highlighted. 
The Create Fixed Baseline 56iGenerate Analysis Runs 58 
lowing options provided by the sensitivity analysis module 
60 is available: 
1 Modify Failure Mode 
Remove Subsystem 
3 Remove Fail Mode 
4 Add Fail Mode 
5 Modify ESD 
Rep1ace subsystem with subsystem from-another 
Project 
7 Change RedundancyiMultiplicity. 
After a new analysis has been run in step S1204, analysis 
results as in steps S1108, S1110, and S1112 in flowchart 116 
of FIG. 16 are provided, but with the original analysis and 
the sensitivity results presented side-by-side, in step S1206. 
Other features provided by the sensitivity analysis module 
60 include saving modified settings, but not running an 
analysis, and viewing documentation provided and stored in 
QRAs 12, 
provide 
phases. Further, the 
Illns for a sing1e phase Or for 2o FIG, 19 shows a selection 122 of stand-alone programs 
122 accessed from the main screen of QRAs 12 and residing can be Or 
saved with documentation. Also, an end state can be selected 
reestablished. 
provided by the Fixed 56 and Generate 
Analysis Runs 58 modules. As shown in FIG. 17, risk is 
ranked by scenario, by failure modeiinitiating event, by 
1. Bayesian Update Program elementsisubsystems, or by single point failures. 
2. Expert Opinion 
options to rank by mean, median, or uncertainty are also 3. Mathematica 
provided. The Bayesian Update Program (l), Expert Opinion (2), 
If the option of ranking by elementsisubsystems is and Mathematica (3) are fixed programs provided with 
selected, then for clusters, several display options are pro- QRAS 12. MATHEMATICA and the BAYESIAN UPDATE 
vided such as displaying both clusters and singletons, dis- 35 PROGRAM are known. Expert Opinion includes various 
playing only the singleton representation of a cluster, and techniques of analyzing risk posed by experts in the field. 
displaying only the cluster and excluding the singleton Additional programs, such as a Monte-Carlo Simulation 
representative of the cluster. Program to handle hyper-distributions, for example, can be 
If the option of ranking by a single point failure is added to QRAS 12 by the individual users. The toolbox 16 
selected, then only singleton scenarios apply. 40 allows users to add programs of their choice. 
FIG. 18 is a flowchart 120 of the functions provided by the FIGS. 20A, 20B, and 20C show utilities provided by 
Perform Sensitivity Analysis module 60 shown in FIG. 4. QRAS 12 distributed across QRAS 12 and available to users 
The Perform Sensitivity Analysis module 60 corresponds to, from a variety of the modules 46-60 of QRAS shown in 
and implements the functions provided in, the Perform FIG. 4. The ut es shown in FIGS. 20A, 20B, and 20C are 
Sensitivity Analysis step S20 shown in FIG. 3. The main 45 available from pull-down menus provided in QRAS 12. FIG. 
functions provided by the Perform Sensitivity Analysis 20A shows edit functions copy and paste, applicable prin- 
module 60 include the options of (1) creating a new analysis, cipally to the build hierarchy module 46 and provided 
(2) modifying an existing analysis, (3) deleting an existing therein. The edit utilities include coping part of the hierarchy 
analysis, and (4) viewing a prior analysis. 62 within itself, copying part of hierarchy 62 from one 
For option (3), delete existing analysis, the sensitivity SO project 63 to another project 63, or copying as previously 
analysis module 60 simple deletes an existing analysis described but including not only the structure of the hierar- 
selected by the user. For option (4), viewing a prior analysis, chy 12 but all quantifications 50 and events sequence 
the sensitivity analysis module 60 simply displays to the diagrams 74. 
user a prior analysis retrieved from memory. FIG. 20B shows options provided by the model report 
When the user selects either option (l), creating a new ss utility 126 of QRAS 12. In the model report utility 126, all 
analysis, or (2), modifying an existing analysis, flowchart or part of the model for a project (such as the hierarchy 62, 
120 shown in FIG. 18 is executed. As shown in step S1200, the event sequence diagrams 74, the event trees 76, etc) can 
a hierarchy level is highlighted based upon user input. The be printed on a printer. In addition, analysis results 59 (as 
hierarchy level determines the range of hierarchy for sensi- shown FIG. 5A) can be exported from the QRAS 12 system 
tivity runs. All parts of the range hierarchy have an (S) 60 installed on the current computer to a QRAS system 12 
appended thereto. Then, for modification of an existing stored on another computer. Alternatively, just the structure 
analysis (option (2)), an existing analysis is selected at the of the hierarchy 62 can be printed, or all quantifications 50 
highlighted hierarchy level or above, in step S1202. An and event sequence diagrams 74 can be printed (or 
existing analysis can be selected for modification multiple exported). 
times, then run. FIG. 20C shows a lock project utility 128 provided within 
When option (l), creating a new analysis, is selected, step QRAS 12. The lock project utility 128 is applicable to the 
S1204 is executed. In step S1204, selection from the fol- build hierarchy module 46, the create mission time line 
in the toolbox 16 shown in FIG, 5A, QRAs 12 provides a 
execution of the selected program, providing required input, 
QRAS toolbox 16 provides access to the following programs 
122: 
based upon h u t ,  and the can be and seamless interface to each of the programs 122, initiating 
25 and displaying results to the user, As shown in FIG, 19, the l7 shows Options 118 for risk 
For all of the above-mentioned ranking options, further 30 
65 
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module 48, the quantified failure modesidocumentation 
module 50, the build and quantify ESDs module 52, the 
include: multiplicities, dependencies, and redundancies 
module 54, and the create fixed base line module 56 of 
QRAS 12 after creating the base, the 
words which are required to alter any of the data inserted 
project utility 128, the base line and all quantifications can 
be viewed, but not changed unless a password is supplied. 
The lock project, therefore, preserves the model that is used i o  
for risk analysis. 
chy Manager 138, corresponding to the Build Hierarchy step 
S10 shown in FIG. 3 and to the Build Hierarchy module 46 
shown in FIG. 4; the Mission Timeline function 140, cor- 
responding to the Create Mission Timeline step s12 shown 
supplies pass- 5 in FIG. 3 and to the Create Mission Timeline module shown 
in FIG. 4; the Failure Mode Quantification function 142, 
shown in 
function 144, corresponding to the BuildiEdit ESD step S16 
shown in FIG. 3 and to the Build and Quantify ESDs module 
52 shown in FIG. 4; and the Multiplicity/Redundancy func- 
tion 146, corresponding to the Include: Multiplicities, 
Dependencies, and Redundancies step S18 shown in FIG. 3 
and to the Include: Multiplicities, Dependencies, and Redun- 
dancies module 54 shown in FIG. 4. 
function 148 shown in 21 
includes 2 active buttons: the Create New Analysis function 
step s20 shown in and to the Fixed 
58 shown in FIG. 4; and the View Analysis Results function 
152, which displays the results of the analysis generated by 
into the above-mentioned modules 46-56. Using the lock corresponding to the Quantify Failure Modes step SI4 
and to the Quantify 
50 shown in 4; the 
EXAMPLE OF QRAS 12 
The following section shows one example of QRAs 12 of 
the present invention, including WINDOWS-based screens 
and explanations of QRAS 12 functions provided by fea- 
tures selected from the screens, The following example 
analysis using QRAS 12, and discusses the toolbox features 
installing the example of QRAS 12. 
The Run Risk 
shows how to create a system model and create and run an 
and special features of QRAs 12, after a brief explanation of 2o 
150, corresponding to the Create and Generate 
56 and the Generate Runs 
QRAs 12 is installed by double clicking the QRAS.exe 
MATHEMATICA 
the Create New Analysis function 150 or by a previously- 
generated, and stored, analysis 59 shown in FIG, 5A. Program. QRAs l2 requires 
(Professional version). Once MATHEMATICA is installed 25 The Perform Sensitivity Analysis function 154 includes 
On the computer, QRAs l2 must be linked to MATH- the Sensitivity Analysis function active button 156, corre- 
sponding to the Perform Sensitivity Analysis step S22 EMATICA 
(a) In the MATHEMATICA directory is found two fold- shown in FIG. 3 and to the Perform Sensitivity Analysis 
ers: Autoload and Addons. First, click on Addons and copy module 60 shown in FIG. 4. 
the Statistics sub-folder (located under Standard Packages) 30 Main Screen 130 includes the Tool Box function 158. The 
into the Autoload folder; (b) QRAs 12 expects MATH- Tool Box 158 corresponds to the Tool Box 16 shown in FIG. 
EMATICA to be in its standard Place: C:\Program 5A. In the example shown in FIG. 21, the Tool Box 158 
Files\Wolfram Research\Mathematica\3.0. If this is the case, includes 3 active buttons, the selection of any of which 
then nothing needs to be done; however, if MATH- invokes either conventional programs provided by the user 
EMATICA is installed elsewhere, the QRAs 12 file that 35 or other conventional programs such as MATHEMATICA 
links to MATHEMATICA must be modified. More 160, Bayesian Updating 162, and Fault Tree 164. 
particularly, in the file Qras.ini in the Windows directory on 
the C drive, the h e  beginning with: InitString=must be 
changed to read: 
2, Using the hierarchy manager 
The user double clicks the desired project 63 and the 
hierarchy screen 166 shown in FIG. 22 is automatically 
I n i t s t r i n g = - l i n k n a m e  o f  40 generated. At the top of the hierarchy screen 166 appear 
menu options 167 for the user to go directly to the functions 
MATHEMATICA must be personalized by entering the 138-158 described with reference to FIG. 21, to a different 
password provided. To do this, click on mathematica.exe project 63, or to file 168 or edit 170 options. The file option 
and enter the password in the designated field on the screen. 168 can be used to open or close a project. 
1. Creating a system model The user can invoke any of the functions 138-158 shown 
Creating a system model begins with creatingiopeningi on the main screen 130 either from the main screen 130 or 
locking a project. All information about a specific system from the hierarchy screen 166 (or from other screens as 
model resides in a single Windows 95 folder. This set of described). 
information is referred to as a “project.” 63, discussed herein Referring now to FIG. 22, the hierarchy screen 166 shows 
above. For example, a model of the Shuttle is a “project”; a SO an elementisubsystemifailure mode hierarchy 62, including 
model of a new turbopump could be a “project.” a project 63, elements 64 and 64-1 of the project, subsystems 
When the user first runs QRAS 12, the main screen 130 66-1 and 66-2 of the elements, and failure modes 68 
appears. The main screen 130 is shown in FIG. 21 and corresponding, respectively to the elements 66-1 and 66-2. 
includes two active buttons: (a) Create New Project 132; and The hierarchy screen 166 indicates that the elementi 
(b) Open Existing Project 134. ss subsystemifailure mode hierarchy 62 is unlocked 172. The 
Clicking “Create New Project” 132 creates a dialog box, hierarchy 62 appears in every window, and the user high- 
requesting a project name. This name is automatically used lights the part of the hierarchy 62 in which the user is 
to create and name a new folder under the “Projects” folder. interested, and this highlighted part of the hierarchy serves 
The new folder holds all information about the project 63, as the link to other modules or features. 
corresponding to the root or project shown in FIG. 5A. 60 When the hierarchy is complete, all failure modes have 
Clicking “Open Existing Project” 134 displays a list of been quantified, and all ESDs input, the project can be 
current projects. “Locked” to prevent modification of the input data. Under 
Also shown as options on the main screen 130 are the the “File” Option 168, a feature is available called “Lock 
Build Risk Model function 136, corresponding to the Build Project.” The user supplies a password and locks a given 
Risk Model step SO8 shown in FIG. 3 and the Build Risk 65 project; the user can also “unlock” the project and change 
Model Module 45 shown in FIG. 4. The Build Risk Model passwords. These options appear under “File” 168 at the top 
function 136 includes 4 active buttons: the System Hierar- of the screen. 
‘ l o c a t i o n  
Mathematica\mathkernel’-mathlink. 
45 
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The Hierarchy Manager is used to construct a decompo- 
sition of the system: root level, elements, subsystems, (sub- 
subsystems if desired) and failure modes-in descending 
order. 
To begin, first click “Hierarchy” at the top of the screen 
166 and select the “BuildEdit Hierarchy” option 138 in the 
pull-down menu. This will activate all options for the 
Hierarchy Manager. Again click “Hierarchy” and select the 
options to build the hierarchical decomposition. The options 
are, in almost every case, self explanatory. There are tool bar 
items for some of the options. These include “Add Element,” 
“Add Subsystem,” “Add Failure Mode,” and “Rename.” 
The “Rename” button allows changing the standard names 
such as “Element” or “Failure Mode” to specific names such 
as “SSME’ or “Weld Failure.” (One can also highlight the 
component (e.g., subsystem, failure mode) to rename and 
push the F2 key. This will automatically bring up the rename 
dialog). There are also “Move Up” and “Move Down” 
options. These allow interchanging positions of the high- 
lighted elementisubsystemifailure mode with the one below 
(or above) it. 
In addition to creating the actual hierarchy, there are 
options for adding documentation (called “Documentation”) 
and storing pictures (called “Images”). A “Documentation” 
button applies to subsystems and elements-not failure 
modes. Failure mode documentation is handled in the “Fail- 
ure Mode Quantification” screens and in the “Event 
Sequence Diagram” screens, explained herein below. 
An element cannot be nested under another element; 
however, a subsystem can be nested under another sub- 
system (in effect, to create a sub-subsystem). The OTIs 
(refer to the Mission Time Line discussion below) apply to 
the lowest level subsystem. 
The Hierarchy is automatically saved as one builds it. 
Thus the “Save” button is not needed for the Hierarchy; all 
other features (e.g., the Event Sequence Diagram) must be 
saved by the user. 
3. Creating the Mission Time Line 
The mission time line (element 70 shown in FIG. 5A) 
does two things: creates global “phases” (for the system) and 
creates “operational time intervals” (for subsystems). 
“Phases” for a project are at the top system level, referred to 
as the “Root” 63 in the hierarchy 62. These phases represent 
global system demarcations, and most analyses are run by 
phase. For the Shuttle, the phases are “Ascent,” “On-orbit,’’ 
and “Reentry.” The user defines up to 10 phases. At least 1 
phase must be created. “Operational time intervals (OTIs)” 
are created for each subsystem (within an element), within 
a given phase. The OTIs establish the start and end times for 
distinct operating modes of a subsystem. Each subsystem 
must have at least 1 OTI. OTIs allow multiple quantifica- 
tions and/or ESDs for a single failure mode within a phase. 
Therefore, OTIs apply to a subsystem, and each failure 
mode and ESD is tagged to a set of specific OTIs for that 
subsystem. 
To create a mission time line, first click “Mission Time 
Line.” 140 Next click the “Define Mission Phases” option. 
The Mission Phase Editor 174 shown in FIG. 23 is then 
displayed. The subsequent buttons and operations for cre- 
ating phases are self-explanatory, including the phase infor- 
mation 178, the phase name 180, the start time 182 for the 
phase, the end time 184 for the phase, the units 186 for the 
start time 182 and the end time 184, updating 188, adding a 
phase 190, deleting a phase 192, print 194, save 196, and 
cancel 198. The Mission Phase editor screen 174 allows the 
user to establish the global system operations phases, includ- 
ing the start and end times for each phase. 
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To create OTIs, first highlight a subsystem 66-1 in the 
hierarchy 62 on the Operational Time Interval screen 176 
shown in FIG. 24. Then click the “Create Operational Time 
Intervals” option 200 in the mission time line menu 140. 
Highlight the phase for the OTI and use the “Add OTI” 
button 202. All start and stop times must fall within a phase. 
Allowable times are displayed in green; erroneous or ques- 
tionable times are displayed in red. In the example shown in 
FIG. 24, the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) 66-1 
has been highlighted, so the OTIs created will correspond to 
the HPFTP subsystem 66-1. 
Finally, the failure modes in the system hierarchy must be 
tagged to the OTIs. To do this, highlight a failure mode 68 
and then, in the mission time line menu 140, click “Make 
OTI Applicable.” (not shown). A grid (not shown) will 
appear below the hierarchy 62, with a box called “APP’- 
for “applicable.” (not shown). An “X’  will appear within the 
box. 
As discussed herein above, the mission phase times and 
OTI times may run from -x to +y. That is, the user can code 
minus times, if desired. In the Shuttle, for example, the 
ascent phase runs from -5 minutes to +13 minutes. 
4. Quantifying Failure Modes 
The Quantification Model Selection screen 204 is shown 
in FIG. 25 and is the top level screen for Failure Mode 
Quantification. “Housing Structural Failure” has been high- 
lighted in the hierarchy 62 (in the example shown in FIG. 
25) and the limit state function 206 has been selected as a 
method of quantification in the example shown in FIG. 25. 
Generally, in QRAS 12, to quantify a failure mode, first 
highlight the desired failure mode 68. Next, highlight an 
OTI in a grid below the hierarchy 62 (or in a dialog box to 
the left of the hierarchy). Finally, click on the top level menu 
option entitled “Failure Mode Quantification.” The drop 
down menu that then appears has only one option: “Quantify 
Failure Mode.” Clicking this option will bring up the main 
failure mode quantification screen. 
There are now 2 main options for quantification: demand 
based, or time based. 
Demand based. The demand based feature has 2 options: 
Instantaneous events (the user can enter a specific time to; or 
indicate the event is instantaneous but the time is not 
specified; e.g., fails to start, but start time not specified); or 
“Success/Failure-viewed over a time interval.” This latter 
option allows quantification where a fixed time interval of 
operation is considered and the user wants to quantify 
whether failure has occurred at any time over the interval. In 
effect, the time interval is considered a single demand. For 
example, in the Space Shuttle, the high pressure oxidizer 
turbopumps run for approximately 520 seconds during 
ascent. One may want to quantify a failure mode of the 
turbopump by considering the probability of failure during 
ascent; i.e., a successifailure demand based, rather than 
strictly time based, quantification. 
FIG. 26 shows the Demand BasedPoint Estimate and 
Uncertainty screen 208, which includes a Documentation 
button 210 for entering documentation. The lognormal dis- 
tribution for P has been selected, and a graph of the 
uncertainty on P is displayed. Prior to quantification, a 
failure mode 68 in the hierarchy 62 has been highlighted. In 
addition, a probability density function (PDF) and a cumu- 
lative density function (CDF) can be selected on screen 208. 
Time based. The time based option is self-explanatory. 
A detailed description of the failure mode quantification 
Afailure mode must be quantified for each OTI for which 
options is provided herein below. 
it has been made “applicable.” 
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In every quantification option, there is an input screen 
which contains a “Evaluate” button. “Evaluate” means: 
verify the legitimacy of the supplied input parameters and 
create the uncertainty distribution. The evaluate button must 
be clicked to complete a quantification. 
A “PE Time Duration” option (not shown) is used when 
quantifying pivotal events with an exponential or Weibull 
distribution. The option allows the user to change the time 
duration for the pivotal event. The default is zero, so that the 
s user must supply a time length; if none is supplied, a 
When quantifying a failure mode, an uncertainty distri- 
bution on the probability of failure is input. The pull-down 
menus on various screens provide for allowable parameter 
combinations to determine the distribution. Once “Evaluate” 
is clicked, the software will determine if any part of the 
distribution lies outside the interval [OJ]. A message will 
appear indicating how much of the distribution will be 
truncated to fit in [OJ], and what the mean of the new 
distribution will be, based on this truncation. 
The options for “limit state function” and “p as a function 
warning message will be given. 
When using a “Copy” (not shown) option, only the 
structure of the ESD segment will be copied. The quantifi- 
cations and names will not be copied. 
An “Insert” (not shown) feature will insert an ESD 
symbol 74-11 after the symbol that is clicked on. 
The user can quantify the failure mode (or, equivalently, 
“initiating event”) in the ESD; however, the quantification 
and documentation are preferably entered via the “Failure 
is Mode Quantification” option 142 in the top-of-screen menu 
i o  
of variables” require the user to input a mathematical 
function. This function must be entered in MathematicaB 
notation. 
options 167. 
6. CreatingBunning an Analysis 
CreatingiRunning an Analysis includes running a stan- 
6a. Running a Standard Analysis 
propagation of events, given the occurrence of an initiating All standard analyses are run from the “Analysis” 150 
event. For QRAS 12, “initiating events (IEs)” are synony- top-of-screen menu option 167. Note that the pull-down 
mous with “failure modes.” So, for each failure modeiOT1 menu for “Analysis” 150 contains 4 options: Create Base- 
combination, an ESD 74 is constructed that shows the line; CreateiRun Analysis; View Prior Analysis Results; and 
potential propagation of the initiating event to various “end zs Delete Baseline. Each of these 4 options is explained below. 
states.” The ESD screen allows the user to construct ESDs, 6.a.l. Create Baseline. Assume that the hierarchy 62 is 
quantify pivotal events, label end states, and store documen- newly-established, the mission time line 70 has been newly- 
tation. created, the failure modes 68 have been newly-quantified 50, 
An event tree 76 for each ESD 74 is automatically and the ESDs 74 have been newly-created. The Baseline of 
constructed and quantified when the Analysis screen is run. 30 QRAS 12 avoids continually generating scenario 
Also note, by definition, a complete path in an event tree is simulations, thus avoiding re-constructing and re-simulating 
called a “scenario.” all scenarios for each analysis run. Specifically, after all the 
To construct an ESD, first highlight a failure mode 68 (in data are input, the user runs a “Create Baseline” function of 
the hierarchy 62). Next, highlight the applicable OTI in the QRAS 12, which invokes the Create Fixed Baseline module 
grid (not shown) below the hierarchv. Then. click on the 3s 56 shown in FIG. 4. The Baseline is then constructed: this 
5. Creating Event Sequence Diagrams 
Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) represent the possible 20 
dard analysis and running a sensitivity analysis. 
v ,  
“Event Sequence Diagram” option at the top of the screen. 
Finally, click on “BuildEdit Event Sequence Diagram” in 
the pull-down menu (not shown). A green circle (the IE or 
synonymously, Failure Mode 68) appears, connected to a 
dotted box-the “place holder.” (not shown). There is a 
floating tool bar 212 on the upper left portion of the Event 
Sequence Diagram screen 214, shown in FIG. 27. This tool 
bar 212 contains buttons: an arrow, a pivotal event (square 
box), a comment (parallelogram), and an end state 
(diamond). Depressing the arrow will deactivate the other 
consists of the lowest level scenarios, with uncertainties 
simulated, at the OTI level. Then, when analysis runs are 
made, the Baseline model is used to “sum-up’’ the lowest 
level scenarios to produce the desired analysis. 
The user can construct the Baseline in stages. A Baseline 
will be constructed for whatever level is highlighted in the 
hierarchy 62 (and, by definition, all lower levels). If other 
portions of the hierarchy 62 are then highlighted, that 
portion of the Baseline is constructed and appended to the 
4s other Baseline parts already constructed. Similarly, the user 
40 
buttons. can delete portions of the Baseline-for example, if a 
One builds the ESD 74 by placing the cursor on a place quantification error was found-and rerun those parts. 
holder 74-11 and clicking. Whatever tool bar 212 symbol Finally, the Baseline can be constructed for only point 
button has been depressed will then be placed in the ESD estimates or point estimates with uncertainty. The point- 
74-11 in lieu of the placeholder. The entire ESD 74 is SO estimate-only version (which computes the “rare event” 
constructed in this manner. In the example shown in FIG. 27, approximation) is useful when initially looking over the 
the Housing Structural Failure 68 is highlighted, and an data; the full uncertainty version is needed to do a complete 
event sequence diagram 74 is constructed for the Housing analysis. Two parameters that apply when generating the 
Structural Failure 68. The OTI grid 216 is checked by QRAS uncertainty option are the probability truncation limit and 
12 to construct the ESD 74. The ESD 74 shown in FIG. 27 ss the Monte Carlo sample size. The defaults (lo-” and 10,000 
applies to the Housing Structural Failure 68 for the “Ascent/ trials, respectively) can be changed in the qras.ini file 
OTI 1” Phase combination. included with QRAS 12. 
There are additional features for inserting, copying, and Once the baseline is established, the baseline-creator can 
deleting that appear in the Event Sequence Diagram pull- “lock” both the baseline and associated hierarchyifailure 
down menu 144, but which are not shown in FIG. 27. 60 modes dataESD data. This prevents other users from chang- 
To quantify and document the ESD pivotal events and to ing the basic data (e.g., a failure mode quantification). To 
label end states, the pull down menu 144 can be used. “lock” the baseline and associated data, click on “File” 168 
Alternatively, click on an ESD element 74-11, and right click. at the top of the screen 167, and then click on the “Lock” 
If “select a place holder” message (not shown) appears, it option (not shown). The user is then prompted for a pass- 
means that the “arrow” in the floating tool bar 212 is not 65 word by QRAS 12. To later delete the baseline or modify the 
depressed; simply toggle it off. All options pertaining to that hierarchy (or failure modeESD data) this password must be 
symbol will then appear in a pull-down menu. supplied. 
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6.a.2. CreateiRun Analysis. First the user highlights the The user creates a new sensitivity analysis by highlighting 
highest level in the hierarchy 62 for which analyses are an “available standard analysis” 228 and clicking the “Cre- 
desired; e.g., highlight a failure mode 68, subsystem 66, ate New Analysis” button 232. A Sensitivity Analysis 
element 64, or the root 63. Next the user clicks on “Create/ Options screen 242 shown in FIG. 30 with the following 
Run Analysis.” (not shown), in which the user enters a name s options 244, with radio buttons, is displayed: 
for the analysis (the analysis will be saved and can be modify quantification of a failure mode 
recalled later under that name) and highlights a phase or 
contiguous phases for analysis; or selects a “time slice” 
option (not shown), to create an analysis that contains any 
portion of the entire mission time line. The user then i o  project 
supplies any textual documentation desired and clicks the remove a 
‘‘Run’’ button (not shown). The Results screen 218 shown in add a failure mode 
FIG. 28 is automatically displayed. modify event sequence diagram. 
The Results screen 218 contains 3 tabs: Quantitative First, the user enters a sensitivity analysis name. Then the 
Results Total 220; Quantitative Results Ranking 222; and is user selects an option, and clicks “Continue” 246. Subse- 
Event Trees 224. The Total tab 220 provides the mean quent subscreens (not shown) are displayed automatically. 
estimate of risk and uncertainties. One can highlight a higher After a given option is completed (by completing the 
or lower level in the hierarchy 62 (provided the analysis subscreens), the main sensitivity option screen 242 is again 
encompassed this level) and see the results for that level. displayed. The user can then cycle through another change. 
(That is, when one runs an analysis at a given level, all 20 Once all desired changes are made, the user clicks “Save and 
analyses at lower levels are also computed). The Ranking Run” 248 or “Save and Do Not Run” 259. The latter will 
tab 2222 provides a ranked list of scenarios (ranked by total create and save a sensitivity run that can be executed at 
mean contribution to risk-at the level highlighted in the another time. 
hierarchy 62); or ranked by failure modeiinitiating event. The Sensitivity Analysis Options screen 242, shown in 
Risks can also be ranked by the median and by importance zs FIG. 30, is the top level options screen for the main types of 
measures. One can also examine a scenario in detail by changes that can be made in an existing risk model for a 
highlighting that scenario and clicking the “View Complete project 63. 
Scenario” button (not shown). To see an individual event It is important to use the “Enter Documentation” button 
tree, note first that each event tree is tagged to a failure 252 on the sensitivity options screen. QRAS 12 does not 
mode-OTI combination. So first a failure mode is high- 30 generate, automatically, documentation of the changes made 
lighted and an OTI (in the grid below the hierarchy) is for a given sensitivity run. It is the user’s responsibility to 
highlighted. Then the Event Trees tab 224 is clicked. document the temporary changes made so that one will 
In the example shown in FIG. 28, the portion for the know what the sensitivity results are based on. 
quantitative totals and uncertainty has been selected. The The analysis results for a sensitivity run are automatically 
level selected is the HPFTP, so that the results are for this 3s displayed (not shown). The display format is almost iden- 
subsystem 66-1. Highlighting another part of the hierarchy tical to the analysis results format, except that both sensi- 
62 will automatically display the results for that level. tivity quanitifications and rankings are displayed juxtaposed 
The view prior analysis results and the delete baseline with the compared standard analysis. 
options are self-explanatory based on the remarks above. The other options on the main sensitivity screen 226 are 
6.b. Running a Sensitivity Analysis 40 straightforward. One can modify the already-made changes 
A sensitivity analysis, or “what if” analysis, allows the in a stored sensitivity analysis to create a new analysis 234; 
user to change quantifications of failure modes and/or event and options allow for viewing the results of a prior sensi- 
tree pivotal events, remove failure modes or subsystems; tivity analysis 236. An analysis can be deleted 238 or printed 
and add failure modes or entire subsystems. These changes 240. In all cases, the user simply highlights the analysis 
are not permanently stored. 
To create a sensitivity analysis, first the user highlights a 7. Tool Box 
level in the hierarchy 62. This level constitutes the “domain” The Tool Box contains stand-alone programs, either 
of the sensitivity analysis; and all sensitivity analyses (for commercially-available or user-developed, that are useful in 
the given run) must be at or below this level. Also, a standard risk analysis. Two examples of programs in the area are to 
analysis must have been previously run covering this level. SO which links are supplied are: MATHEMATICA, and a 
The requirement for an existing, stored, standard analysis is BAYESIAN UPDATE PROGRAM. 
needed because the sensitivity analysis will display the 8. Special Features 
original values along with the new sensitivity values. There are 2 features that are important for creating or 
Next, the user clicks on the “Sensitivity Analysis” option building up “projects” 63, and that were mentioned herein 
156 at the top of the screen 167. A single pull-down menu ss above. These are the “Copy/Paste” and the “Copy/Paste 
option of createimodifyiview analysis is displayed (not Special” features in the Edit menu 168. These features apply 
shown). Clicking this menu option yields a Sensitivity almost exclusively to the hierarchy 62. The foregoing fea- 
Analysis screen 226 shown in FIG. 29 and displaying tures are not shown, but the functions thereof are discussed. 
available standard analyses 228 that apply at the level Assume first that one wants to copy parts of an existing 
selected (domain) in the hierarchy, as well as any stored 60 hierarchy internally within a given project. “Copy” and 
sensitivity analyses 230 that may apply. The Sensitivity “Paste” can be used. The user highlights the element 64, or 
Analysis screen 226 shown in FIG. 29 is the screen display- subsystem 66 (a failure mode 68 cannot be copied), and 
ing the main options for viewingimodifyingicreating a new clicks on “copy.” Next, the user highlights the element 64 or 
analysis. subsystem 66 below which the group is to be pasted and 
Any standard analysis 228 conducted at any level above 65 clicks “paste.” The previously copied hierarchy structure 
the level highlighted is listed because a standard analysis will be pasted. If one wants to copy not only the hierarchy 
covers all levels at and below the selected level. structure 62, but also the failure mode quantifications, OTIS, 
a subsystem 
a subsystem with a subsystem from another 
mode 
4s name and clicks the appropriate button. 
US 6,223,143 B3 
27 
and ESDs, the user uses “Paste Special” rather than “Paste.” 
The above features will thus allow duplication internally 
within a hierarchy. 
The phrase “below which” used in describing the copy 
and paste features is explained. If, for example, one wants to 
copy a another subsystem as part of an Element, highlight 
the Element; the subsystem will be copied as the last 
subsystem under the Element. One does not highlight a 
subsystem under the Element and seek to copy the source 
subsystem below this highlighted subsystem. Assume now 
one wants to copy parts (or all) of a hierarchy from one 
project to another distinct project. (Assume that both 
projects reside on the same computer, within the QRAS 12 
directory). Noting that more than a single project can be 
“open” in QRAS, use the same method(s) noted above. In 
this way, new projects or parts of projects be directly added 
to a hierarchy to build-up a model. 
When using “Paste Special” between projects, the phases 
for the mission time line of the source and target projects 
should match (the system only requires that the numbers of 
the source project does not exceed the number of phases of 
the target project). The QRAS 12 will check and alert the 
user if the number phases of the source is greater than that 
of the target project. The QRAS 12 will not check to see that 
the actual phase times are identical. The target phases will be 
used. Because OTIs are defined at the subsystem level, the 
OTIs are transferred directly. 
Finally, suppose a user has created a project and wishes to 
transfer the project to another user on another computer. 
Attaching a project via e-mail is not satisfactory because a 
“project” is a folder containing approximately 125 files, and 
each would have to be attached separately. The user can, 
however, transfer the project folder via a File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP) program. In this way, any project can be 
transferred to any other user. (Code Q is establishing an FTP 
server site for this purpose). 
One can create a copy of a project to modify that does not 
contain a baseline, and hence does not have a locked 
hierarchy, mission time line, etc. First, create a new project. 
Then add mission phases to the new project (this is neces- 
sary because the Paste Special feature will check to insure an 
equal number of phases between projects). Finally, use Paste 
Special to copy the source project into the new project. 
“CopyiPaste,” “CopyPaste Special,” and FTP are useful 
in dealing with systemisubsystem upgrades. For example, 
once a system is modeled, a user can develop an upgraded 
subsystem. The original subsystem can be deleted and the 
upgraded subsystem can then be pasted into the model-to 
assess risk impact. 
9. Failure Mode Quantifications are discussed in detail. 
Failure mode models are input in any of the following 
9.a. Point estimate and uncertainty 
Quantification is in the form of a point estimate and an 
uncertainty density function (with parameters specified) 
from Table 2. In some cases, parameters or percentile 
bounds are given to characterize the uncertainty distribution 
(so, in these cases, specification of a point estimate is not 
needed). 
forms: 
9.b. Function of physical variables 
Quantification is in the explicit form p=f(x,, . . . , xk) 
where p is a real-valued function in [OJ], the xi ( i=l to k) 
represent physical variables, each with an uncertainty den- 
sity function (chosen from Table 2) which describes the 
probability of the allowed physical values, and k 5 3 .  
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TABLE 2 
Uncertainty Density Functions 
and Parameters to be Specified 
Density 
Function parameters sets: 
Specify the one of the following 
Uniform 
Normal 
Lognormal 
Triangular 
(symmetrical) 
Beta 
Gamma 
Weibull 
Discrete 
Mean and standard deviation; mean 
and maximum; maximum and minimum; 
5th and 95th percentiles 
Mean and standard deviation; 5th 
and 95th percentiles 
Mean and standard deviation; mean 
and error factor; median and error 
factor; 5th and 95th percentiles 
Mean and standard deviation; 
maximum and minimum 
Mean and standard deviation; 5th 
and 95th percentiles; xo and so 
parameters (failures, successes) 
Mean and standard deviation; 5th 
and 95th percentiles; shape (a) and 
scale (fi) parameters 
Mean and standard deviation; scale 
(a) and shape (fi) parameters 
Number of intervals ( 5 2 0 )  and end 
point for each interval to form a 
histogram 
The Density Functions shown in Table 2 are individually 
conventional and individually known, but the toolsioptions 
to enter the parameters and the uncertainties do not exist in 
other software packages. 
9.c. Predefined functions for p 
Quantification, as in b., above, is in the form p=f(x,, . . . , 
xk) with k 5 3 .  But in this case standard “canned” functions 
are specified from the following list: 
(1) Logistic Regression Model: p=f(,, . . . , xk)=l/(l+l/ 
exp(a,+a,x,, . . . , ask)). Specified are the variables, x,, . . . , 
xk, their associated ai parameters, and density functions 
(chosen from Table 2) for the xi. 
(2) Discrete function: 
Specified are the intervals and the constant values on each 
interval. Also specified are density functions for each xi from 
Table 2. 
9.d. Limit state function 
Quantification is in the form of a limit state function, 
g(x,, . . . , xk). This function has the property that g smaller 
than a limit value, co (a constant, usually 0), denotes failure 
(gzc,  denotes success). The probability of failure is there- 
fore p=Prob[gec,]. Specified are: 
(1) the function g; 
(2) the limit value, c,; and 
(3) the uncertainty density functions (chosen from Table 
2) for each variable xi. 
(4) The uncertainty density around the point estimate for 
the probability of gec,; the options are: 
(a) Lognormal: probability of gec, is assumed to be the 
median; user specifies the error factor. 
(b) Uniform: probability of gec, is assumed to be the 
mean p; user can specify min as kp, where O5kel .  
k is specified by the user. 
(c) Beta: with probability of gec, assumed to be the 
mean p; and N is specified, where N represents the 
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sample size (as p=f/N, where f is viewed as the 
number of failures. In this way the uncertainty 
expands or contracts, based upon the decreasing or 
increasing size of N, respectively). 
ensuing pivotal events); d) event sequence diagrams; e) 
analysis module (to allow, at any hierarchy level-and 
below, automatically-a presentation of the risk-by end 
state-with uncertainties; a ranking by failure mode, 
9.e. Reliability for time interval [O,t,] s scenario, sybsystems based on mean, median, uncertainty); 
For a given failure mode, the probability of failure for the and f )  an multiple sensitivity analyses based an analysis run, 
time period of operation is specified; e.g., probability of allowing changes in multiple parts of the original risk model. 
failure over 128 seconds for an SRB failure mode. Let Further, QRAs 12 uses Event Sequence Diagrams (as 
R(tP1, . . . denote a reliability function, with Parameters distinguished from event trees (event trees are automatically 
ai ,  for example, R(t;h)=exP(-ht). Note now that if a sub- 10 generated)) and links these to the failure modes 
system functions for a time to, the reliability at t=t, is simply (equivalently, “initiating events,”), 
R(t,;h) and the failure probability is l-R(t,;h). This is the In addition, QRAS 12 is user-friendly and provides a wide 
value specified, as a point estimate. The precise form of the 
reliability function, R(t;a,, . . . , a d ,  must be specified along dard reliability quantifications, standard and some nonstand- 
with the uncertainty as a density function for each parameter IS ard (e,g,, “conditionay>) failure probability quantifications, 
ai of R from Table 2. and probabilistic fast probability integration (FPI) engineer- 
ing design methods. Each option allows for inclusion of 
uncertainties in estimates, QRAS 12 includes a documenta- 
tion feature integrated with the actual quantified model- 
2o and automatically calls a text editor for documentation 
input; and stores images. Thes features are easily accessed 
through the hierarchy and the applicable risk model module 
(e.& Failure Mode Quantification). 
Further features included in QRAS 12 are summarized 
To facilitate speed and ease of analysis, simulations at the 
lowest possible level are generated only once and stored as 
a “Baseline.” Other analyses then access this “Baseline”- 
rather than recreating all fundamental simulations again for 
each analysis. Analyses are stored and serve as a comparison 
for any sensitivity runs. That is sensitivity analyses are not 
viewed as independent runs-but are compared with an 
original stored analysis run. Also, the Baseline is not 
changed by a sensitivity run. It is fixed. 
To enable use by multiple engineersianalysts, the risk 
model (hierarchy, mission tirne line, quantifications, E S D ~ ,  
Baseline, etc.) is ‘‘locked’-using a user-supplied password. 
Thus, no inadvertent changing of the primary model data can 
4o occur. This, in turn, ensures that all runs and results obtained 
are consistent across users. 
QRAS 12 includes a Risk Analysis Based CopyPaste 
Feature which allows copying the hierarchyiquantificationsi 
and event sequence diagrams (or just the hierarchy structure) 
‘‘projects, Abenefit is that 
this allows different users to develop different parts of a risk 
model (e.g. a subsystem of a larger system) and then another 
individual can assemble the entire model. (see below). Also, 
Summary coupling this feature-across projects-with the use of File 
In summary, the present invention QRAS 12 provides so Transfer Protocol (FTP) allows a project created by any user 
hierarchical decomposition of a system-from top level at one computer machine to be used by another user on a 
down to elements (these are “collections” of subsystems), to different computer machine. 
subsystems down to failure failures-that serves as both the The software architecture and flow of the QRAS 12 are 
visual organization and internal link to: quantification, event organized so that both a skilled engineerianalyst or a high 
sequence diagrams, analysis, and sensitivity features. 5s level manager can develop, access, and/or view the esti- 
The QRAS 12 system is an integration of: Hierarchy; mated risk values, uncertainties ranking and risk model 
Mission Time Line (System and subsystem times of 
functioning); Failure Mode Quantifications and ensuing The QRAS 12 provides a Mission Time Line which serves 
scenarios (Event Sequence Diagrams); Multiplicity/ to partition the global system operation (into contiguous 
RedundancyiDependency structure; an Analysis module; a 60 “Phases”), and to both communicate the operational time 
Sensitivity Module; and a Stand-alone “Tool Box”. intervals (OTIs) for each subsystem and to allow 
Further, Q R A  12 is an integration of all the following in (automatically) failure modeireliability quantifications 
a) system decomposition (with based on time-without reentering time values. 
multiplcities, redundancies, dependencies); b) subsystem The QRAS 12 design allows finer gradations of time 
times of functioning and global top level system “phases” 65 intervals for quantification-by allowing Phases 
(mission time line); c) failure mode quantification and (contiguous, discreet intervals of system operation) and 
documentation (per element, subsystem, failure mode, and subsystem “Operational Time Intervals” (OTIs) that provide 
variety of quantification options-incorporating both 
9.f. Reliability function (exponential) 
Similar to e., above, but based on an exponential reliabil- 
ity function: 
R(t)=e-*‘ 
The mean failure rate, h, is specified, along with an 
9.g. Reliability function (piecewise exponential) 
Quantification is in the form of a piecewise exponential 
uncertainty about h from the density options in Table 2. 
2s herein below. 
reliability function: 
30 R(t)=e-*l‘ for t s t ,  
R(t)=e~*l‘le~*z(“l) for t 1 < t =  <t2 e*=. 
Specified are: 
(1) Time intervals,: start and end times, ti, for each. Note 
that there is a limit of 3 time intervals. 
For each interval i, an uncertainty density for hi is specified 
from Table 2. 
3s 
9.h. Reliability function (Weibull) 
R(t) is given as: 
R(r) = e-(Z) 1 0  
where a is the scale parameter and fl is the shape parameter. 4s both within a ‘‘project” and 
uncertainty densitiesdhosen from Table 2. 
Both a and fl are specified along with their respective 
documentation of a complex engineered system. 
a single linked unit: 
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for tagging failure modes to particular time intervals for 
each subsystem within the large system Phases. 
Regarding statistical density failure mode quantification, 
the QRAS 12 allows specification of one ofa set of param- 
eters that uniquely characterize the distribution; 
automatically, other sets of parameters that would also 
characterize the distribution are computed internally and 
displayed for the user. 
For uncertainty density computation and truncation by 
QRAS 12: when a user enters parameters to characterize an 
uncertainty distribution (which must lie in the interval [OJ]), 
software will determine what percentage of distribution 
must be truncated so that is in the [OJ,] interval and display 
message along with new computed mean value. 
QRAS 12 allows a copyipaste feature with event sequence 
diagrams. 
For multiplicity and redundancy: QRAS 12 uses a simple 
schema via the Hierarchy to indicate and internally compute 
risk for multiple “elements,” “subsystems,” and failure 
modes; in a similar hierarchy modification, QRAS 12 
handles redundancy within the same type of unit. 
For multiplicity in QRAS 12: element, subsystem, or 
failure mode X is displayed in the Hierarchy as X(k), where 
k is the Multiplicity; Redundancy: subsystem X is displayed 
as X(k-of-n), where k out of n are required for success. 
Generally, QRAS 12 provides a unique method to handle 
multiplicities and redundancies for subsystems (and failure 
mode for multiplicities) by having a graphical entry of an 
integer into a system hierarchical decomposition. 
For dependency in QRAS 12: Based on design of com- 
bining the Hierarchy with a “fault tree-behind-the- 
hierarchy”-to handle dependencies between differing ele- 
ments and/or subsystems; and the inclusion of a screen with 
“fl,,=” and “flPemFailure=” to handle “Common Cause” beta 
factors. 
The analysis feature in QRAS 12 allows running software 
at a given level of the hierarchy and generating analysis 
results at that level and all lower levels. 
In addition, QRAS 12 provides the ability to store and 
recall prior analyses; similar feature for sensitivity analyses. 
QRAS 12 also provides the capability to perform Sensi- 
tivity Analyses, with features including: 
(a) -change failure mode quantification; 
(b) d h a n g e  ESD; 
(c) -delete failure mode; 
(d) 4 e l e t e  subsystem; 
(e) -replace subsystem with subsystem from another 
( f )  -modify redundancy, multiplicity, or common cause 
The “Tool Box” Feature of QRAS 12: Allows stand-alone 
programs to be added to the software platform. Tool Box, 
itself, is a repository and functions as an interface to these 
stand-alone programs. 
Further, the QRAS 12 Platform is integrated with Math- 
ematica. 
Also, QRAS 12 provides a Baseline with a capability to 
selectively delete parts of the Baseline and reestablish- 
without deleting remaining parts of the Baseline. 
Analysis computations for ranking risks by both indi- 
vidual scenarios or collectively by failure mode is provided 
by QRAS 12. QRAS 12 collects all scenarios initiated by a 
given failure mode. QRAS 12 also ranks risk by subsystem; 
in all rankings, the basis is by by median, by mean, or by 
uncertainty. 
project; 
dependency beta value. 
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QRAS 12 provides for determination of risk by various 
End States (e.g., catastrophic end state for system; perma- 
nent failure of a subsystem). 
QRAS 12 also provides risk ranking: by mean; median; 
Report Feature to printout the entire risk model (or 
selective parts) in total is provided by QRAS 12. 
In addition to printing all analysis results, QRAS 12 
provides the capability to export electronic analysis files- 
for use in other reports or to transfer electronically. 
In QRAS 12, there is an organization of models by 
“Project.” Each project is self-contained, and multiple 
projects may be opened and used together. The discrete, 
self-contained set-up of each project means that a project 
received from one user is directly usable by another user. 
QRAS 12 also provides an embedded text editor (for 
documentation) and uniformity of documentation via a fixed 
format text document that is called-up when the failure 
mode documentation feature is accessed. 
Further in QRAS 12 are Functional Subsystem 
20 Groupings, which is a feature to allow grouping various 
elements and/or subsystems and/or failure modes in the 
hierarchy viewed as performing a specific function (e.g., 
“propulsion”) and determining the risk and risk rankings by 
this functional grouping. 
In QRAS 12, quantifications of failure modes allow not 
only absolute probabilities, but conditional probabilities. 
This is integrated with the multiple “Phases” time line. 
An event tree automatically generated by QRAS 12 from 
Event Sequence Diagrams, and can be viewed as part of the 
30 analysis module. While fault trees handle only a single type 
of “end state” failure for a given tree, and software links 
fault trees to event trees by tagging fault trees to the 
underlying event tree initiating and pivotal events (in the 
event tree, or ESD), QRAS 12 views fault trees at a higher 
35 level (rather than a lower level) and essentially uses the 
event tree (or ESD) scenarios to propagate up the fault tree. 
In this way, different types of “end states” are considered by 
QRAS 12. 
QRAS 12 also provides a “Time Slice” Feature: Given 
40 Phases, the design allows for analysis combining phases and 
by “slicing” between phases: e.g., given [start, stop],, [start, 
stop],, [start, stop], as representing Phases 1 ,  2, 3 
respectively, can specify a Start time within Phase 1 and a 
Stop time within Phase 3 and risks are computed for this 
While current software can rank scenarios or failure 
modes, the QRAS 12 also allows ranking at higher levels- 
by subsystems, clusters of subsystems, functional groupings 
of subsystems. Also, because the Hierarchy allows multiple 
50 “indentations” (or subsystems of subsystems), one can 
group failure causes under a “subsystem” and thus rank a set 
of failure causes for a higher level failure mode in QRAS 12. 
The many features and advantages of the invention are 
apparent from the detailed specification and, thus, it is 
5s intended by the appended claims to cover all such features 
and advantages of the invention which fall within the true 
spirit and scope of the invention. Further, since numerous 
modifications and changes will readily occur to those skilled 
in the art, it is not desired to limit the invention to the exact 
60 construction and operation illustrated and described, and 
accordingly all suitable modifications and equivalents may 
be resorted to, falling within the scope of the invention. 
5 uncertainty measures. 
10 
2s 
45 period of a globally specified Start and Stop time. 
What is claimed is: 
1. An apparatus assessing risk of failure of a system, said 
65 apparatus comprising: 
a build risk model module building a risk model of the 
system, said risk model including an element/ 
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subsystemifailure mode hierarchy, a mission timeline 
linked with the hierarchy by indicating what are phases 
for global system functioning and providing time inter- 
vals  for failure modes for each subsystem, corresponding message is displayed to the user. 
mulitiplicities, redundancies, and dependencies across 5 
the system and at a subsystem level and above by an 
embedded fault tree behind the hierarchy, a failure 
mode quantification, event sequence diagrams that link 
with initiating events of the event sequence diagrams 
being the failure modes in the hierarchy, tagged by 
Phase and operational time intervals of the respective 
subsystems; 
a create fixed baselineigenerate analysis runs module, 
coupled to the build risk model module, creating a fixed 
baseline of the system that generates and stores the 1s hierarchy by the risk model. 
lowest-level scenarios of the risk model preserved in 
event-tree structure, with linkage via the hierarchy to 
time-based or demand-based quantification, and pro- 
viding for multiple user-defined analysis runs using the 
11. The apparatus according to claim 9, wherein a per- 
centage of distribution which must be truncated to allow 
uncertainty between 0 and 1, inclusive, is determined and a 
12. The apparatus according to claim 9, further compris- 
ing a toolbox including a set of internal codesiprograms 
quantifying, off-line, the components of the risk model. 
13. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the 
elementisubsystemifailure mode hierarchy comprises a mul- 
tiplicity number k corresponding to an element, a subsystem, 
or a failure mode of the elementisubsystemifailure mode 
hierarchy, and that the corresponding element, the corre- 
spending subsystem, or the corresponding failure mode is 
accounted fork times in the elementisubsystemifailure mode 
14. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the 
15. A method of assessing risk of failure of a system, said 
baseline is locked and unlocked using a password. 
method comprising: 
fixedbaseline; and 20 
a perform sensitivity analysis module, coupled to the 
create fixed baselineigenerate analysis runs module, 
altering any of the components or combination thereof 
that are fundamental to construct the baseline without 
modifying the baseline itself, and using an existing 2s 
analysis run, generating the sensitivity run with the 
user-supplied sensitivity changes, presenting both the 
original runs and the new sensitivity-derived results. 
2. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the build 
a risk model module further comprises a create mission 30 
timeline module creating the mission timeline of the system 
comprising top level, contiguous phases for the system and 
multiple operational time intervals for each discrete 
subsystem, wherein the create mission timeline module tags 
3. The apparatus according to claim 2, wherein the build 
risk model module further comprises a quantify failure 
modesidocumentation module quantifying the failure modes 
of the system tagged to the operational time intervals and 
4. The apparatus according to claim 3, wherein the build 
risk model module further comprises a build and quantify 
ESDs module building and editing event sequence diagrams 
tagged to the operational time intervals and phases. 
risk model module further comprises an include 
multiplicities, dependencies, and redundancies module 
which includes in the risk model the multiplicities, 
failure modes to the operational time intervals. 3s 
storing documentation displayed upon user request. 40 
5. The apparatus according to claim 4, wherein the build 45 
building a risk model of the system by a build risk model 
module, said risk model including an elementi 
subsystemifailure mode hierarchy, a mission timeline 
linked with the hierarchy by indicating what are phases 
for the system functioning and providing time intervals 
for failure modes for each subsystem, mulitiplicities, 
redundancies, and dependencies across the system and 
at the subsystem level and above by an embedded fault 
tree behind the hierarchy, a failure mode quantification, 
event sequences diagrams that link the initiating events 
of the event sequence diagrams with the failure modes 
in the hierarchy, tagged by Phase and operational time 
intervals of the respective subsystems; and 
analyzing risk in the system by creating a fixed baseline 
of the system and providing for individual risk analyses 
by accessing the baseline and tagged to levels of the 
hierarchy, said fixed baseline generating and storing the 
lowest-level scenarios of the risk model preserved in 
event-tree structure, with linkage via the hierarchy to 
time-based quantification, and providing for multiple 
user-defined analysis runs using the fixed baseline by 
altering the components or combinations thereof that 
are fundamental to construct the baseline without modi- 
fying the baseline itself with user-supplied sensitivity 
changes, and using an existing stored analysis run, 
generating a sensitivity run with the user-supplied 
sensitivity changes, presenting both the original run 
and the new sensitivity-derived results. 
16. The method according to claim 15, wherein the - 
dependencies, and redundancies of the system at the mission timeline comprises top level, contiguous phases for 
element, and/or subsystem, and/or failure mode levels. SO the system and multiple operational time intervals for each 
6. The apparatus according to claim 5,  wherein the create discrete subsystem, and wherein the the failure modes are 
fixed baselineigenerate analysis runs module determines the tagged to the operational time intervals. 
probabilities of failure over scenarios and ranks risks by 17. The method according to claim 16, wherein building 
subsystems or failure modes using fundamental units of a risk model further comprises quantifying the failure modes 
failure. ss of the system tagged to the operational time intervals and 
7. The apparatus according to claim 6, wherein risks are storing documentation displayed upon user request. 
ranked by end states. 18. The method according to claim 17, wherein building 
8. The apparatus according to claim 5,  wherein the build a risk model further comprises building event sequence 
and quantify ESDs module automatically generates event diagrams tagged to the operational time intervals and auto- 
trees from the event sequence diagrams. 60 matically generating event trees displayed on individual 
9. The apparatus according to claim 5, wherein the analysis runs. 
hierarchy is combined with the fault tree behind the hierar- 19. The method according to claim 18, wherein building 
chy to account for dependencies between differing elements a risk model further comprises including multiplicities, 
or subsystems. dependencies, and redundancies, at the element, subsystem, 
models are organized by project independent of other 20. The method according to claim 15, wherein the 
projects. elementisubsystemifailure mode hierarchy comprises a mul- 
10. The apparatus according to claim 9, wherein risk 65 or failure mode levels. 
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tiplicity number k corresponding to one of an element, a 
subsystem, and/or a failure mode of the elementisubsystem/ 
failure mode hierarchy, and that the one of the element, the 
subsystem, and/or the failure mode are accounted fork times 
in the elementisubsystemifailure mode hierarchy by the risk 
model, and having a fault tree capability behind the hierar- 
chy to handle failure, redundancy, dependency of the ele- 
ments and/or subsystems, across differing elements and/or 
subsystems. 
21. The method according to claim 20, further comprising 
addressing common cause failures by the inclusion of a fl 
factor. 
22. A computer-readable medium storing a program, said 
program directing a computer to assess risk of failure of a 
system by executing the steps of  
building a risk model of the system by a build risk model 
module, said risk model including an element/ 
subsystemifailure mode hierarchy, a mission timeline 
linked with the hierarchy by indicating what are phases 
for the system functioning and providing time intervals 
for failure modes for each subsystem, mulitiplicities, 
redundancies, and dependencies across the system and 
at the subsystem level and above by an embedded fault 
tree behind the hierarchy and inclusion of k or k-of-n in 
the hierarchy decomposition levels, a failure mode 
quantification, event sequences diagrams that link ini- 
tiating events of the event sequence diagrams with the 
failure modes in the hierarchy, tagged by Phase and 
operational time intervals of the respective subsystems; 
and 
analyzing risk in the system by creating a fixed baseline 
of the system and providing for individual risk analyses 
by accessing the baseline and tagged to levels of the 
hierarchy, said fixed baseline generating and storing the 
lowest-level scenarios of the risk model preserved in 
event-tree structure, with linkage via the hierarchy to 
time-based and demand-based quantification, and pro- 
viding for multiple user-defined analysis runs using the 
fixed baseline, and using an existing analysis run, 
generating a sensitivity run by altering any of the 
components or combination thereof that are fundamen- 
tal to construct the baseline without modifying the 
baseline itself with the user-supplied sensitivity 
changes, presenting both the original runs and the new 
sensitivity-derived results. 
36 
23. The computer-readable medium according to claim 
22, wherein building a risk model further comprises creating 
a mission timeline comprising top level, contiguous phases 
for the system and multiple operational time intervals for 
5 each discrete subsystem, wherein the create mission timeline 
module tags failure modes to the operational time intervals, 
by phase. 
24. The computer-readable medium according to claim 
23 wherein building a risk model further comprises quan- 
tifying the failure modes of the system tagged to the opera- 
tional time intervals and storing documentation displayed 
upon user request. 
25. The computer-readable medium according to claim 
15 24, wherein building a risk model further comprises building 
event sequence diagrams tagged to the operational time 
intervals and automatically generating event trees displayed 
on individual analysis runs, and quantifying the pivotal 
events in the event sequence diagrams, selecting various end 
20 states, and allowing for documentation of the pivotal events 
and initiating event. 
26. The computer-readable medium according to claim 
25, wherein building a risk model further comprises includ- 
ing multiplicities, dependencies, and redundancies, at the 
25 element, subsystem, or failure mode levels linked directly to 
the hierarchy. 
27. The computer-readable medium according to claim 
22, wherein the elementisubsystemifailure mode hierarchy 
comprises a multiplicity number k corresponding to an 
30 element, a subsystem, and/or a failure mode of the element/ 
subsystemifailure mode hierarchy, and that the element, the 
subsystem, and/or the failure mode are accounted fork times 
in the elementisubsystemifailure mode hierarchy by the risk 
model, and having a fault tree capability behind the hierar- 
35 chy to handle failure, redundancy, dependency of the ele- 
ments and/or subsystems, across differing elements, and/or 
subsystems. 
28. The computer-readable medium according to claim 
27, further comprising addressing common cause failures by 
40 the inclusion of a first fl factor for common cause failures 
that are directly catastrophic, and a second fl factor for 
permanent but non-catastrophic failures which, in 
combination, lead to catastrophic failures. 
10 . ’. 
* * * * *  
